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The Navy's various weapons project officers
routinely decide whether to use existing weapons
technology or to extend into as yet undeveloped
technology. For state-of-the-art ( SOA ) extensions,
initial estimates of development cost frequently are
inaccurate. This study first examines the background
of methods utilized for SOA extension measurement.
This study also reviews the cost estimating methods
used by Litton Applied Technology, Inc. to estimate the
development costs of the AN/ALR-67 Radar Warning
Receiver, a specific SOA extension project. The
principal findings are that regression analysis and
geometric surface analysis are used to quantify SOA
extensions, but only in theoretical applications.
Litton Applied Technology uses the bottoms-up approach
to estimate development costs. The future trends in
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE
This thesis will describe how Litton Applied
Technology of San Jose, California measured and
estimated the cost of the state-of-the-art development
of the AN/ALR-67 Radar Warning System. This case study
will be utilized by Professor Willis Greer to test an
improved cost estimating model which will relate
measurements of state-of-the-art extensions with costs.
B. BACKGROUND
During the past three years, budget restraints have
forced the Navy to tighten controls over expenditures
for major weapons systems. One area which has
generated significant unplanned cost growth during the
last two decades has been the extension of states-of-
the-art ( SOA ) . The cost impact of SOA extensions is
most keenly felt during the demonstration and
validation phase, and the full scale development phase
of the acquisition process. During an interview with
GTE cost analyst Stan Swales on 17 September 1987, he
estimated most cost models for initial SOA development
efforts were only accurate to within twenty to forty
percent. However, once the generic cost models were
"calibrated" with actual cost parameters and the
technical characteristics of the completed system, the
range of accuracy could be reduced to five to ten
percent. [Ref. 1]
During the concept exploration process of new
weapons systems, the Navy must decide if the risks of
unplanned cost growth should deter extending as-yet
undeveloped technology. Prior contractor research,
primarily by the Rand and General Research
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Corporations, has made progress in defining and
measuring the extent of technological change in complex
defense systems, primarily aircraft related. These
prior studies have concentrated on the generation of
cost models for specific applications under Department
of Defense (DOD) contracts, rather than a defined cost
model for general use by Navy systems commands. For
example, Dr. E.N. Dodson developed the High-Energy
Laser Systems Cost Model (Caliper II) for the Air Force
Weapons Laboratory at Kirkland Air Force Base, New
Mexico. [Ref. 2] However, the Navy has yet to
coordinate new cost estimating models with the Air
Force .
Cost models which could accurately delineate the
association between levels of SOA extensions and cost
overruns would enhance budgeting accuracy. Most budget
analysts for multimillion dollar weapons systems
utilize the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) authorized
by the DOD Cost /Schedule Control Systems Criteria.
[Ref. 3] Effective, comprehensive cost models are
required for initial hardware development cost
estimates, particularly in the constantly changing
electronics environment. The Navy's negotiating
capabilities during acquisition for new technological
systems will be strengthened with increased expertise
in SOA extension resource estimation.
One field rapidly gaining in importance and
magnitude is software cost estimating, which experts
like Elmer Branyan from General Electric predict will
account for eighty-five percent of all embedded
computer costs by 1990. [Ref. 4] Defense cost models
must assimilate and utilize the latest techniques
incorporated in software models developed by RCA
(Price-S model) and Hughes Aircraft (developed by Dr.
Jensen )
.
Hardware cost estimation for initial developed
relies on three primary tools: estimation by analogy,
use of cost estimating relationships (parametric
costing), and systems engineered analysis (detailed
bottoms up estimation). These three methods are
applied on the basis of available data, which will be
differentiated and described in Chapter Two.
The following quotation by Larry Smith emphasizes
the fundamental nature of accurate estimating:
The process of estimating is the process of making a
prediction or forecast of predefined events and/or
occurrences weighted and influenced by subjective
and objective information. The planning techniques
that are available rely on the estimates to develop
schedules, resource histograms, budgets, cash flow
histograms, and performance standards. The results
and sophisticated methodology are only as good as
the input estimates. The time spent developing good
estimates and the understanding required to produce
good estimates, will reduce the need for major
revisions to the plan and schedule. Good estimates
will reduce schedule slippage and cost overruns
and set the stage to facilitate the implementation of
project plans. [Ref. 5]
C. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to describe and
analyze how defense contractors control the cost of
states-of-the-art extensions. Litton Applied
Technology, located in San Jose, California will be the
subject of the case study. This thesis compares
Litton's development cost estimate of the AN/ALR-67
Radar Warning System with their actual development
costs. Also, Litton's methodology for quantifying the
SOA extension to the AN/ALR-67 Radar Warning System is
analyzed.
The following factors integral to Litton's
management of the AN/ALR-67 Radar Warning System are
also discussed:
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1. Litton's cost estimation process for each of the
following acquisition phases: concept exploration
demonstration and validation, full-scale
development, and initial production. The
process description will indicate which cost
techniques were utilized by Litton for each
phase
.
2. Litton's use of modern parametric models in
hardware and software cost estimation.
3. Soundness and range of Litton's control system in
monitoring and reducing cost, schedule, and
performance variances.
4. Specific variance analysis by phase,
concentrating on the effectiveness of Litton's
cost model
.
5. External factors impacting Litton's current
initial production, such as the current GAO
investigation of commonality problems between
Navy and Air Force radar warning receivers.
6. Organizational design and interaction of the
primary departments involved in the SOA
extension
.
A key secondary objective, as discussed in Chapter
Two, is to clearly delineate the history of previous
research of states-of-the-art extension questions. The
fundamental theory and key elements of early SOA
measurement equations from 1965 to 1985 are outlined.
Examples of SOA model applications to aircraft turbine
engines, ground combat surveillance radars, computers,
and laser weapons systems is presented.
D. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question examined was: how
effectively did Litton estimate the development and
11
production costs of the state-of-the-art extension of
the AN/ALR-67 Radar Warning System? Subsidiary-
questions will deal with Litton's budgetary models for
predicting and controlling costs. Their methods of
cost control are also explored.
Three subsidiary questions were:
1. What previous research has been conducted on
weapon system's state-of-the-art extensions?
2. Which cost estimating relationships were
utilized in Litton's cost estimation of the
development program?
3. Was there an association between levels of SOA
extension and cost overruns?
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This thesis concentrates on two specific areas.
First, Litton's cost estimation process in measuring
the state-of-the-art advance from the AN/ALR-45 to the
AN/ALR-67 Radar Warning System is thoroughly discussed.
Second, the SOA measurement theory, control and
planning techniques for defense contractors involved in
research and development programs is analyzed. For
example, the general nature of the S-curve is
described. The S-curve represents how technology
initially advances slowly, then rapidly gains momentum
and eventually slows down when it nears the natural
limits of the technology. [Ref . 6] Contractors must
be able to accurately locate their exact position along
the curve, to determine applicability of SOA
extensions
.
In summary, the case study describes, then assesses
Litton's ability to accurately predict and control
development and production costs for the AN/ALR-67
Radar Warning System. Peripheral information is
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provided as review factors in the organization and
budget process which contribute to the firm's success.
The principal limitation of this case study is that
there is no guarantee that observations are
transferable to another environment, setting, project,
or firm. For example, the unique mission of fighter
aircraft radar warning systems may negate the transfer
ability of finds to commercial aircraft manufacturing
firms. Also, one sample may not be truly
representative of shipbuilding projects, the primary
focus of Litton's other defense divisions.
Litton Applied Technology placed restrictions on
availability of the exact algorithms utilized in their
cost-estimation model. Specific cost data which might
reveal overhead rates or management reserve factors to
their competitors was withheld. Also, the cost
estimator primarily responsible for initial development
costs during the 1975-79 time frame was not available
for interviews. The rationale behind the initial cost
estimates was not clearly documented, so many
observations of the SOA extension will be based on
secondary sources. Additionally, due to the
unclassified nature of this thesis, many current
mission and performance parameters of the AN/ALR-67
Radar Warning System are omitted.
F. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
Extensive research has been conducted on methods of
cost estimation for weapons systems. The majority of
the literature is based on parametric models, both for
hardware and software cost estimation. Significantly
less literature, however, is available on measurement
of state-of-the-art advances. Knowledge about the
critical process of high technology cost estimation
13
will enable a more credible analysis of Litton's cost
estimation procedures for the AN/ALR-67 Radar Warning
System. This case study can then explore the extent to
which theoretical research from the past two decades is
practically utilized, if at all, by one of our
country's leading defense electronics manufacturers.
For SOA extensions background literature, the
following key authors and their specialties are
highl ighted
:
1. A. A. Alexander: estimation of advanced technology
in turbine engines.
2. E.N. Dodson: quantitative measurement of state-
of-the-art through use of planar and ellipsoid
surfaces
.
3. Richard Foster: analysis of the S-curve, or
Gompertz curve, characteristics.
4. Results from the 1983 Technological Forecasting
Conference which focused on this area.
The methodology for this thesis primarily was a
case study of Litton Applied Technology, Inc., in San
Jose, California. Specifically, personal interviews
were conducted over a period of two months with the top
managers involved in the AN/ALR-67 development. Among
the key company personnel interviewed were Eugene E.
Deimling, Director of Business Development, and Donald
R. Bowden, Director of Cost Estimating and Analysis.
Personal interviews were also conducted with Dr. Edward
Dodson, Director, Economic Resources and Planning Group
of General Research Corporation, Santa Barbara,
California, and Stan Swales, Cost Estimator for GTE
Government Systems, Inc., Mountain View, California.
Searches through the Naval Postgraduate School
Library and the Defense Logistics Systems Logistics
Exchange were also conducted. The primary journals
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investigated were "Research Management", "IEEE
Transactions on Engineering Management", and
"Technological Forecasting and Social Change". Also,
current articles ordered from the librarian of the
Space Systems Cost Analysts Group and the International
Society of Parametric Analysts, Mr. Clyde Perry, were
reviewed
.
Finally, the Litton Pricing and Cost Estimation
Manual was examined, with particular emphasis on
procedures for state-of-the-art developments.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The remaining chapters of this thesis are organized
as follows:
1. Chapter Two: Literature review of previous
studies of state-of-the-extensions measurement
theory is presented. Also, comparisons between
various hardware and software cost estimating
models are made. Mechanisms espoused in current
literature for controlling high technology
development projects is briefly outlined.
2. Chapter Three: A historical narrative of two
cost estimation models by Dr. E.N. Dodson is
presented. Examples will depict cost elements
which have factored into them SOA technological
factors
.
3. Chapter Four: The actual cost data from the
AN/ALR-67 is presented, along with a description
of Litton's pricing and cost estimation system.
Interviews with key individuals are addressed.
4. Chapter Five: The analysis of variances found in
the cost data, and external events which have
impacted Litton's development of the AN/ALR-67
15
are discussed. Comparisons from the case study
to relevant theory are made.
Chapter Six: Conclusions and recommendations
developed in this case study are concisely





This chapter explores the background literature
pertinent to measurement and control of state-of-the-
art advances. In particular, a chronological outline
of SOA measurement history from 1969 to 1985 is
presented. The chapter is subdivided into the
following key areas:
1. Ostwald's basic guidelines for measuring
technological advances and cost estimating
relationships
.
2. Dodson's approach to quantitative measurement of
advances in state-of-the-art in January 1969.
3. Dodson's studies in resource estimation for
development programs from October 1969.
4. Rand Corporation's study of measurement of
technological change in aircraft turbine engines
(June 1972).
5. Hovanssian's description of key parameters
integral to research and development of large-
scale electronic systems (August 1975).
6. Dodson's development of cost equations to measure
technological change in high-technology systems
(May 1977).
7. Gordon and Munson's proposed convention for
measuring the state-of-the-art of products
(1981 ).
8. Alexander and Mitchell's measurement of
technological change of heterogeneous products
( 1985 ) .
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9. Martino's measurement of technology using
tradeoff surfaces (1985).
10. Dodson's measurement of SOA and technological
advance ( 1985 ) .
11. Cooley, Hehmeyer,and Sweeney's model of research
and development resource allocations (1986).
12. McDonough ' s identification of effective
characteristics of management control systems of
new product development projects (1984).
13. Smith's summarization of best techniques for
estimating time, cost, and resources in new
developments (1985).
14. Evaluation of the key hardware and software cost
estimation models used in advanced technology
development and production contracts.
B. OSTWALD'S BASIC TOOLS FOR COST ESTIMATING
Ostwald's "Cost Estimating for Engineering and
Management", published in 1974, provides the essential
basis for detailed, practical cost estimates. [Ref. 7]
Stan Swales, cost estimator at GTE, recommended
Ostwald's book as a prerequisite to analyses of current
cost estimating techniques. Ostwald details the first
unified treatment of the philosophy, concepts, and
practices of the cost estimating field. The
fundamentals of three ideas pertinent to later studies
of SOA advance are introduced: cost estimating
relationships ( CER ' s ) , cost indices, and technological
forecasting
.
1 . Cost Estimating Relationships
Ostwald describes CER's as functional models
that mathematically describe the costs of components as
functions of one or more independent variables. CER's
are used to estimate physical quantities such as number
18
of radars or personnel. CER * s also can express rates
of activity for support personnel as a function of the
number of direct radar operators, for life cycle cost
studies. In aerospace electronic industries, CER ' s can
be used to estimate turbojet engine development cost as
a function of maximum thrust and production quantity.
Three fundamental elements must be present in CER ' s
:
a. Logical relationship of the variable to cost,
b. Statistical significance of the variables'
contribution, and






Ostwald defines technological forecasting as
"logical analyses that leads to quantitative
conclusions about future engineering qualities and
properties." [Ref. 8] He recommends evaluation of
technology trends to find the critical independent
variables on which the dependent variables rely.
Correct analysis of the S curve is an essential
ingredient. The S curve is a feature of nature that
diagrams how electronic components are subject to flat
and slow growth in the early years, rapid middle-life
development, followed by stability and eventually
decline as new products evolve. General technical




Ostwald also describes how cost indices
enable estimators to forecast the cost of new designs
based on similar items in the past, without going
through detailed "bottoms-up" costing. The cost index
is a dimensionless number for a given year, indicating
the cost of that year relative to a base year. The
19
shows the conversion from costs to equivalent costs in
the present.
C. DODSON'S APPROACH TO QUANTITATIVE MEASUREMENT OF
ADVANCES IN STATE-OF-THE-ART (JANUARY 1969)
In 1969, Dr. E.N. Dodson defined state-of-the-art
in concept as the highest degree of technical
accomplishment that could be achieved at any point in
time. [Ref. 9] This was later revised to represent the
state of best implemented technology. This early study
focused on parameters which comprehensively influenced
achievable engineering designs.
Dr. Dodson stated that the following constraints
must be met before SOA advances could be quantitatively
measured
:
1. A geometrical surface with continuous derivatives
that interpolates between implemented design
characteristics is used to approximate the true
state-of-the-art.
2. The surface should be either convex or concave in
all dimensions, permitting plane surfaces.
3. Each pair of design characteristics must be
negatively correlated to allow tradeoffs on
single state-of-the-art surfaces.
Considering these constraints, Dr. Dodson asserted
that a convex hypersurface reasonably represented SOA
surfaces. Actual data points are fitted to convex
surfaces in ellipsoid geometric forms via mathematical
relationships. The chosen physical or performance
characteristics must be among those derived early in
the concept exploration acquisition stage. These
characteristics should be influenced by engineering
development decisions to have relevance to SOA
determination. Also, Dr. Dodson stipulated that
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characteristics should be specified so that increasing
values corresponded with increasing technical
difficulty.
Dr. Dodson worked with subsystems of solid
propellant missiles, maintaining the Department of
Defense Work Breakdown Structure. Three parameters of
propulsion subsystems which met his mandatory
prerequisites were: delivered specific impulse,
propellant mass fraction, and length-to-diameter ratio.
These parameters were considered the primary, but not
all inclusive, factors which represented the
technological advance. These variables influenced
areas of SOA relevance such as variations in chamber
pressure and burning rate. Dr. Dodson then assigned
values to these parameters based on the Chemical
Propulsion Information Agency Rocket Motor Manual. His
next action was to classify these motors in various
time periods according to year of development
completion
.
Dr. Dodson 's purpose in quantifying measurements of
advances in the SOA was to test the hypothesis that SOA
extensions influenced the costs required for
development programs. Through geometric methods, he
based SOA measurement advances upon how data points fit
above existing SOA surfaces. The data points
represented the chosen parameters, classified by year
of development. The measured SOA advance becomes a
function of the proportionate increase in the radial
drawn from the origin through the surface to the new
data point. The SOA advance is indicated by the
squared proportional increase.
Dr. Dodson summed up his 1969 study by stating that




1. Attributes of design efforts directly related to
the particular system development program, and
2. Contributions from general research and
development factors, which can be represented by
dummy variables identified for specified major
technological advances.
D. DODSON'S STUDY OF RESOURCE ESTIMATION IN
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
Dr. Dodson, in a study for the Assistant Secretary
of Defense, elaborated his earlier study on SOA
advance. He described the SOA for a particular point
in time, with n representing the number of SOA design
characteristics. These characteristics could trade off
upon one another. Some examples are weight, speed, and
size for fighter aircraft's SOA.
Dr. Dodson indicated that Work Breakdown Structures
should be used to divide whole weapons systems, such as
missiles, into subsystems. SOA specification for an
aggregate system would not be reliable since subsystem
technologies are distinct and will advance
independently of one another. For example, missile
propulsion and guidance subsystems evolved separately,
with different primary parameters. He recognized that
information about performance, development costs, and
development time of subsystem is severely limited, due
to contractor reluctance to divulge this information.
In this report, Dr. Dodson concentrated on
specifying SOA measurement equations for inertial
guidance systems for missiles. Accuracy, weight, and
reliability were selected as the principal parameters
affecting SOA. These three factors could be
quantified. They explained, based on engineering
22
judgment, most of the resources spent on advancing the
SOA.
The measure of SOA for accuracy was maximum range
divided by Circular Error Probable {CEP} for inertial
guidance systems. CEP represented the acceptable
distance a missile must steer to its target. This
distance could be fractions of miles for a nuclear-
armed ballistic missile. Since state-of-the-art
advance always increases, the above equation indicated
that, as range increased, given accuracy became more
difficult to achieve.
The measure of SOA for weight was the number one
divided by the guidance system weight. Dr. Dodson's
study found light guidance systems outperformed heavy
ones since they permitted greater range and payload.
The SOA parameter for reliability was mean-time-
between-fai lure (MTBF). For inertial guidance systems,
reliability was critical due to the continuous state of
twenty-four hours a day alert status.
Dr. Dodson indicated several reasons why production
cost was not a good choice for an SOA parameter:
1. Costs prior to development would be derived from
cost estimating relationships, which would not be
historically reliable.
2. Learning curves could not be established before
actual engineering efforts had been expanded to
reduce costs.
Finally, by geometric measures of the data points
for accuracy, weight, and reliability on an ellipsoid
surface, SOA advance indices were developed. Some SOA
index numbers were 2.945 for the Pershing missile, and
120.200 for the Polaris missile. Research using the
SOA parameters demonstrated Pershing had a relatively
low SOA advance for two reasons:
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1. Relatively low accuracy at maximum range, and
2. Low reliability.
Finally, Dr. Dodson devised a logarithmic approach
to measure the cost of an SOA advance, in relation to
time. His basic hypothesis stated that time and cost
are interrelated resources. He developed an equation
treating the cumulative cost to complete development
(C) as a dependent variable, with the measured advance
in SOA (S) as an independent variable. The elapsed
time to development completion (T) would be stipulated
by the planner. The equation took the form of:
log C = a + b log S + C log T,
where a,b, and c were designated parameters, based
on the system.
The next section outlines how Rand Corporation
expanded on Dr. Dodson 's approach.
E. MEASURING TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN AIRCRAFT TURBINE
ENGINES
Alexander and Nelson from Rand Corporation
developed techniques in 1972 to measure technological
advance in weapons acquisition. [Ref. 10] Their
initial studies focused on aircraft turbine engines.
Their goal was to capture mainstream trends and improve
estimates of costs and schedules during the system
acquisition cycle.
Alexander and Nelson used multiple regression
analysis to develop an equation containing the primary
parameters important in turbine engine technological
change. Like Dodson previously, they estimated
multidimensional tradeoff surfaces of the key turbine
engine parameters. Using regression analysis, they
traced out the movement of the tradeoff surface over
time .
24
The equation they developed to calculate indices
for turbine engine development was:
Tech = -1187.5 + 156 Ln Temp + 18.8 Ln Thrust-
26.5 Ln Weight - 20.6 Ln SFC + 11.7 Ln Q + 13.0
Prop
.
The dependent variable represented the technology
index, which was measured in quarters of a year
beginning in January 1943. The independent variables
represented were:
1. Temp = turbine inlet temperature in degrees
Rankine
.
2. Thrust = military sea level static thrust in
pounds
.
3. Weight = engine weight in pounds.
4. SFC = specific fuel consumption at military sea
level staticthrust (lb/hr/lb).
5. Q = maximum dynamic pressure in pounds per square
foot
.
6. Prop = dummy variable, equal to one if the engine
was a turboshaft or turboprop, zero or otherwise.
Alexander and Nelson found that the major turbine
engine manufacturers had similar tradeoff surface
shapes. However, the two major manufacturers, General
Electric and Pratt and Whitney, were approximately two
years ahead of their competitors in level of
technology
.
Alexander and Nelson specifically addressed the
question: "Can a technique be developed for objectively
quantifying the technological state of the art of a
particular type of system?" [Ref. 11] Their analysis
utilized the following two assumptions:
1. Limited numbers of parameters adequately
characterized the system under study.
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2. Historical continuity prevailed such that the
selected parameters characterized the system even
during different time periods.
Alexander and Nelson also recommended the use of
performance parameters rather than technical
parameters, to give greater emphasis to outputs than
inputs. However, they acknowledged their final
equation contained both technical and performance
parameters. Their data used in their study came from
engine manufacturers, and standard sources such as
"Jane's All the World's Aircraft." Turbine engines
were well-suited for analysis due to their strong
technological trends, such as the increase in aircraft
speeds and the progression of engine types.
Alexander and Nelson subjected the data to
statistical tests with different subdivisions to find
the equation with the best "fit" over the tradeoff
surface. However, they did not develop specific
equations for obtaining the cost of development of the
technological advance. They hypothesized
quantification of the technological setting were
necessary prerequisites, before the cost question could
be answered.
In the next section, Hovassian's Key Parameters
necessary for development of electronic systems are
examined
.
F. HOVANSSIAN'S DESCRIPTION OF KEY PARAMETERS
Hovanssian described the research and development
phase of a hypothetical large-scale electronic system,
based on his study of applicable programs. [Ref. 12]
He stated that the initial design phase should always
include a state-of-the-art analysis of the key system
design parameters. This analysis should include a risk
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evaluation of potential problem areas such as
technology, cost, or time. He stated that the more
current performance measures are advanced, the greater
the risk involved.
Hovanssian did not develop any models to estimate
the SOA advance. However, many of his cost estimating
techniques matched those of Litton Applied Technology.
Litton's cost model is described in Chapter Four.
Hovanssian stated that the cost-estimating
relationship technique should only be used during early
stages of development. He recommended that the cost-
estimating relationships be based on statistical
analysis of similar equipment. If statistical data on
similar equipment was not available, then he
recommended the utilization of "bottoms-up" system-
level cost estimating. In systems-level estimating,
costs are derived from consideration of manpower, basic
units, components, parts, or other relevant factors.
Hovanssian also described "design-to-cost"
modeling. In this technique, various design
configurations are tested against specified performance
parameters. The successful design configurations are
traded off to determine which yields the lowest life-
cycle cost. Life-cycle costs included both the total
procurement cost of the system and its future operating
costs
.
Finally, Hovanssian stated that most electronic
systems must include customer-acceptance parameters at
the development stage, or face possible cost overruns
later in the life-cycle. Among the parameters listed
were :
1. Life cycle cost.
2. Maintenance skill required to repair the system.
27
3. Number of maintenance employees required to keep
the system in working order.
4. Percentage of time the system is available for
use
.
5. Reliability (measure elapsed time between two
consecutive failures).
6. Amount of maintenance required per operating
hour .
7. Quantity and type of spare parts required.
8. Operator approval of new system.
9. Degree of automation.
10. Improvement over previous systems.
In summary, Hovanssian's paper pointed out many
parameters and fundamental concepts which entered into
the design and development process for large electronic
systems. In the next section, Dr. Dodson's updated
1977 study on quantification of SOA advance is
outl ined
.
G. DODSON'S DEVELOPMENT OF COST EQUATIONS TO MEASURE
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
In May 1977, Dr. Dodson outlined procedures to
account for technological change via research and
development cost equations. He indicated research and
development costs were directly influenced by the
degree of extension to the SOA by a given program.
[Ref. 13] His measurement approach to the SOA advance
evolved from a combination of his earlier study
(discussed in section C) and Alexander and Nelson's
paper (discussed in section D). Dr. Dodson felt this
new approach would be easier to implement.
This approach featured four key elements:
1. Independent variables for a multiple regression
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equation would consist of a limited number of
key technical parameters.
2. The dependent variable would be a consistently-
defined calendar milestone. For example, a
completion of qualification test would
represent this milestone for applicable
subsystems
.
3. An expected date (Ye) for achievement, for the
parameters designated as independent variables,
would be the result of a multiple regression
exercise
.
4. The residuals of the difference between the
expected end the actual date of achievement
(Y estimated - Y actual), would be the measure of
the relative technological advance.
Dr. Dodson illustrated his theory through his
previous research on avionics computers. The
computers' key parameters were selected from technical
data as:
1. The speed of the computer in operations per
second
.
2. The density of the central processing unit in
pounds per cubic foot.
3. The number of distinct instruction types in the
computer
.
Dr. Dodson also documented the actual date of
development completion for each computer as Y actual.
The difference between the expected and actual dates of
completion represented the change in SOA , in units of
years
.
Once the residual was calculated, it was
incorporated into a cost estimating relationship. The
dependent variable would represent the development cost
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associated with the specific SOA advance. The
independent variables were:
1. XI, which represented the residual difference
between the expected and actual dates of
development completion.
2. X2 , which equalled one for microprogrammable
computers, or zero for synchronous computers.
3. X3 , which equalled one for space computers, or
zero for airborne computers.
The resulting equation developed by Dr. Dodson to
calculate the monetary amount correlated with SOA
advance was:
Y = 6.11 + 2.7 XI - 4.57 X2 + 14.8 X3
Dr. Dodson recognized several limitations to his
SOA measurement approach. The equation might simply
reflect a change of mission requirements, rather than
indicate technological advance. To remedy this
potential problem, he recommended that variables should
be stated via efficiency measures like thrust per
pound, rather than absolute-scale measures like thrust.
Dr. Dodson also recommended in this paper that
electronics development firms should develop an output
index to account for year-to-year changes in
manufacturing productivity. He felt that failure to
consider productivity changes contributed to errors in
estimating electronics procurement costs. Two reasons
for productivity changes were:
1. Changes in design and manufacturing technology
which reduce the cost per unit of output.
2. Operational requirements for performance
increases
.
Using costs as the dependent variable, cost
estimating relationships were derived by Dr. Dodson for
the technology output indices. In this case, the year
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of development completion became an independent
variable. The regression coefficient represented the
annual change in costs due to shifts in the
relationship between productivity and cost.
In summary, Dr. Dodson developed a method to
measure the financial impact of SOA advance. In the
next section, Gordon and Munson proposed an alternate
method for measuring the SOA advance.
H. GORDON AND MUNSON' S PROPOSED CONVENTION FOR
MEASURING THE SOA OF PRODUCTS
In 1981, Gordon and Munson developed for the
National Science Foundation a general equation to
measure SOA advance. [Ref. 14] The equation derived
was :
SOA - Kl (P1/P2') + K2 (P2/P2') + ... Kn (Pn/Pn').
In the above equation Kn represented the relative
weight associated with each parameter describing the
technology. Pn indicated the value of the parameter
chosen to describe the SOA, while Pn ' represented the
maximum reference value of the parameter.
Gordon and Munson developed their SOA equation to
satisfy the following criteria:
1. The same estimate of SOA should be produced by
any analyst studying the same technology.
2. The SOA value should be in an index format, based
on a reference value.
3. The equation should satisfy any level of
technological aggregation.
Gordon and Munson discussed two techniques critical
to the choice of parameters and their relative weights:
Judgmental and statistical techniques. They
recommended Delphi-related procedures, the utilization
of experts to choose the proper parameters for the SOA
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equation. Delphi procedures sought expert judgment via
anonymity and controlled feedback, to obtain the most
objective inputs. For example, electronic voting
devices were utilized to allow expert practitioners
freedom to provide anonymous answers to questions posed
by group moderators.
Gordon and Munson also listed several statistical
methods available to estimate weights and parameters of
the SOA equation. The techniques included: multiple
regression, stepwise regression, discriminate analysis,
cluster analysis, multidimensional scaling, and factor
analysis. In factor analysis, for example, a
correlation matrix was utilized to group variables into
classes of highly correlated components. These classes
were taken as parameters through construction of an
index from individual members of the class.
Gordon and Munson applied their theory against
antibiotics and computers. They formulated a
performance index for computers based on the judgments
of an expert panel using the Delphi approach. The
following three parameters were chosen to characterize
computers
:
1. Computer speed by operations per second.
2. Cost of computation by operations per dollar.
3. Maximum memory size by kilobytes.
Gordon and Munson used computerized statistical
techniques, based on their assumption that the state-
of-the-art function is an S-shaped curve. Using their
results, they developed an SOA index for computers,
ranking the IBM 3033 computer as the SOA leader.
Gordon and Munson felt their process of calculating
SOA measures could be applicable to any field,
including integrated circuits. In the next section,
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Alexander and Mitchell's study of technological change
of heterogeneous products is outlined.
I. ALEXANDER AND MITCHELL'S MEASUREMENT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
In 1985, Alexander and Mitchell developed
procedures to measure technological change of
heterogeneous products. [Ref. 15] They designed a
framework in which to place empirical measures of
technological change, hedonic price indices, and cost
estimating relationships. In this study they estimated
technological change equations for milling machines,
turbine-powered airliners, and turbine engines. Like
Dodson earlier, they realized product characteristics
alone could not define technological change.
Alexander and Mitchell derived a tradeoff function,
based on a tradeoff surface of cost, performance,
technical characteristics and time. The entire
tradeoff surface represented the state-of-the-art of a
given period. The tradeoff function was written as:
C = C (PI, . .
.
, Ps, ql, . .
. , qj . t ).
The variables in this function were:
1. "C" = average cost of the product.
2. "P" = performance characteristics or user
outputs.
3. "q" = factor prices (assumed to be fixed).
4. "t" = time.
Their equation meant technological change in
products arose from three factors:
1. Productivity or performance improvements.
2. Improved factor inputs.
3. Production process improvements.
Alexander and Mitchell noted that their equation
took the form of the typical cost estimating
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relationship, with cost as the dependent variable. The
dimensionality of the state-of-the-art surface was
limited by the difference between the total number of
variables and the number of constraints. Their most
important reason for including costs in the measure of
technological change was their belief that higher
levels of performance were attained through the
expenditure of more resources.
Alexander and Mitchell studied the technological
histories of milling machines, airframes, and aircraft
turbine engines, summarizing their specific results in
this paper. They concluded that measures based on
product characteristics must be evaluated carefully,
since selection of a few core characteristics often
neglects other attributes whose relative importance my
have changed over time. They felt productivity
measures based on user outputs, such as cost per mile
for aircraft, were more likely to capture the totality
of technological change.
In the next section, Martino's studies, which also
concentrated on measurement of SOA surfaces, are
highl ighted
.
J. MARTINO'S MEASUREMENT OF TECHNOLOGY USING TRADEOFF
SURFACES
In 1985, Joseph Martino followed up Alexander's
theoretical derivation of the designer's tradeoff
surface with an empirical approach. He concentrated
only on those technical parameters which were relevant
to measuring the SOA. He viewed the SOA as a "surface
in some multidimensional parameter space." [Ref. 16]
Martino stated that an SOA advance was a
prerequisite before designers could move to higher
surfaces. He reasoned that designers were constrained
34
by technology and economics to stay on the SOA surface.
As a result, improving the value of one technical
parameter, such as speed, meant sacrifice of another
parameter, such as weight. He examined several
technologies to see if the data values on a surface had
a discernible or random pattern. His goal was to
determine the actual variables involved in design
tradeoffs
.
Martino's theories drew heavily from Dodson's work
except for two statistical differences:
1. Martino extended his method to allow ellipsoid
surfaces of any order, not just level two.
2. Martino's surface fitting procedure was changed
to minimize the Mean Absolute Deviation rather
than Mean Square Deviation.
He felt Dodson's fitting method was prejudiced by
extreme date values.
Martino applied his surface-fitting procedures to
clipper sailing ships, jet engines, propeller-driven
aircraft, and power transistors. In selection of
variables, he avoided the problem of scale effects by
using nondimensional variables. For example, he
divided a size variable by a "characteristic length" to
cancel out scale effects. He also utilized "data
triplets", where two positively correlated variables
negatively correlated with a third variable.
Martino's primary results were that:
1. Deviations from the SOA surface could be
explained quantitatively by known
characteristics.
2. Different configurations representing the same
SOA belonged on the same surface.
3. An engineering analysis was necessary in order
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to select the proper variables. Designers were
asked what parameters they worked on to improve.
4. The tradeoff surface technique worked for all
levels of the Work Breakdown Structure.
In the next section, Dr. Dodson's 1985 update of
his SOA measurement theory is discussed.
K. DODSON'S MEASUREMENT OF SOA AND TECHNOLOGICAL
ADVANCE
Dr. Dodson's paper for the Workshop on Technology
Measurement, Dayton, Ohio (12-14 October 1983), was
published in 1985. [Ref. 17] This paper summarized his
earlier works from 1969 to 1977. Also, he included two
other approaches used to measure SOA advance.
Dodson described the factor analysis approach, a
statistical technique for analyzing variance. He felt
that factor analysis would help in identifying the
underlying relationships of the many physical and
performance characteristics of components. For
example, he used factor analysis to rank sixty rocket
motors by "Technological Distance Scores". He gathered
data from the Chemical Propulsion Information Agency
Rocket Manual for the following nine variables:
1. Delivered specific impulse.
2. Mass ratio (propellant weight/ motor weight).
3. Length-to-diameter ratio.





6. Average thrust/ burn time squared.
7. Average thrust.
8. Average chamber pressure.
9. Date of development completion.
The factor analysis for the nine variables was able
to account for eighty-three percent of the total
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variance of these variables. From the computed
Technological Distance Scores, Dodson demonstrated
graphically in this paper the effects of changes in
mission requirements and technological capabilities.
For example, the mission objectives for the Sprint
missile required fast burning motors. Overall, this
missile represented a significant technological
advance
.
His second new approach to measurement of SOA
focused on the time available to develop levels of
technology. His results revealed that for a given
number of years, the higher the desired technology, the
greater the risk. Conversely , the more time available,
the lower the risk. However, Dodson 's research has not
extended this variant of the time factor into specific
examples of SOA measurement. His paper indicates that
application of this feature to multiparameter SOA
surface equations must be a subject of future study.
L. MODELING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT RESOURCE
ALLOCATION
Cooley, Hehmeyer , and Sweeney developed the
Technology Resource Allocation Model (TRAM) to analyze
the impact of project selection, funding, scheduling,
technical risk, and staffing upon an organization's
research goals. [Ref. 18] Cooley's model was designed
to answer what-if questions such as : what performance
degradation could be expected if a five year
development period was shortened to three years? The
important design considerations in this model were:
realism, model flexibility, ease of use, and output
format. TRAM produced both tables and graphs which
plotted the expected progress of the research effort as
a function of time.
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TRAM was structured to allow variability by
analysts in the following factors:
1. Required funding by work unit.
2. Actual funding by work unit.
3. Probability of success by work unit.
4. Engineer manager work load by engineer manager.
5. Contribution factor for each work unit.
6. Schedule extension by work unit.
7. Performance objectives by work unit.
Cooley's model included consideration of the S
curve effects. S curves normally depicted
transpiration of relatively long lead times before
significant results were achieved.
TRAM enabled the researcher to quickly analyze the
effects of budget reductions on state-of-the-art
development projects. Different measures of
effectiveness were generated by variances of cost,
schedule, and performance criteria. The sensitivity
analysis for TRAM was accomplished through use of the
DYNAMO Compiler.
M. MANAGEMENT CONTROL OF NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS
McDonough felt management control systems were an
essential ingredient in the success of state-of-the-art
development projects. [Ref. 19] His research found
that management control directly impacted SOA projects
in the following ways:
1. Accuracy of cost and duration estimates.
2. Rate of progress of the SOA project.
3. Size of the development budget.
4. Quality of the output.
5. Competitive ability of the organization.
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McDonough's paper identified the characteristics of
effective management control systems. He also
identified deficiencies common to most research and
development organizations.
McDonough surveyed twelve large new product
development projects. He found four elements common to
all SOA developments. The first element was setting
goals for new product projects. He found the primary
goals were cost budgets and schedules. McDonough's
results revealed that pressure from the Marketing
Department forced the majority of project leaders to
submit unrealistic low cost and duration estimates. He
also found product specifications were of more concern
to top management than budget or schedule overages.
McDonough's second element was the monitoring of
project progress. Companies surveyed used three
devices to monitor projects: written reports, formal
meetings, and informal meetings. He found written
reports and formal meetings had drawbacks in timeliness
and detail for highly innovative technology-based
projects. The personal monitoring of projects by top
management via informal methods was the only way to
quickly remedy new problems.
McDonough's third critical element was management's
response to deviations from schedules and budgets. He
found most companies reluctant to take action on
technical issues of SOA projects. Their most common
solution was to simply assign more engineers, an action
that results indicated rarely provided desired effects.
McDonough's fourth element for management control
systems was incentive provisions for performance. He
found management rarely tied individual rewards to the
attainment of budget and schedule goals.
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In summary, McDonough stated the "management by-
walking around" was the key to successfully controlling
new SOA projects. He also recommended bonuses to
project managers who met budgets and schedules.
N. SUMMARIZATION OF RULES FOR BETTER ESTIMATES
Smith's paper provided an overall summary on the
research and application of time, cost, and resource
estimating. [Ref . 20] He developed rules for
generating better estimates applicable to any project.
The following list presents Smith's key factors
necessary for the estimating process:
1. Level of Detail: provide a more detailed
description via increased levels of the work
breakdown structure.
2. Precise knowledge of the task being estimated.
3. Competency and knowledge of the process being
estimated
.
4. Importance of the estimate: estimates must
appreciate significance.
5. Common units: all cost estimates should reflect
the same dimensions.
6. Uncertainty: estimates should indicate measures
of the maximum possible error.
7. Assumptions should be explicitly stated.
8. Uncontrollable variables should be incorporated.
Smith felt estimates could be improved by use of
more than one technique, such as estimating by analogy,
firm quotes, handbook estimating, parametric
estimating, or regression analysis. He also stated
that relevant historical data was often overlooked. He
stressed the importance of detail in the work breakdown
structure, so errors in one estimate would not have a
great aggregate effect. Finally, Smith stated
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management could use certified professional estimators
for uncertain projects, since they would possess
increased appreciation for the repercussions of
estimates on the baseline plan.
0. EVALUATION OF KEY SOFTWARE COST ESTIMATING MODELS
In 1981, Thibodeau performed the Air Force's first
large scale study of the various software cost
estimating models used to make estimates of the
resources to be invested in the software subsystems.
[Ref . 21] Thibodeau recognized that hardware cost
estimating was more advanced, possessing more
identifiable measures of size and performance which had
been correlated with cost. He found there were no
reliable procedures for quantitatively describing the
effects of non-product factors on cost.
Thibodeau evaluated and provided descriptions for
the following models: Aerospace, Boeing, DOD Micro
Estimating, Doty Associates, Tecolote, Wolverton, PRICE
S, SLIM, and Farr and Zagorski . He provided one page
summaries for each model type, including descriptions
of the estimating procedure, characterization of
productivity, and outputs.
Thibodeau' s comparison of the outputs indicated
1. Supporting materials for the models did not
precisely state the elements included in their
estimates
.
2. The models were more adept at satisfying
information early in the acquisition life cycle.
3. The models were acquisition phase oriented and
did not describe activities that crossed
different phases.
4. Only PRICE S kept track of the cost on a
component basis and accounted for the cost of
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system integration. However, none of the models
could provide costs for every level called for in
the Work Breakdown Structure.
Thibodeau measured performance based on the
relative root mean square error. He found:
1. Recal ibration was the primary contributor to
differences in model estimating performance.
2. The structure of the model was not significant to
estimating accuracy.
3. The development environment significantly
influenced the performance of the cost estimating
models
.
4. The use of size as an input had no effect on the
relative performance of the models.
5. The average root mean square estimating error was
between fifteen to thirty percent.
In his final section, Thibodeau provided
recommendations for future model development and better
data definition and collection. Finally, Thibodeau
described the derivation of technology and complexity




Chapter Two described a sampling of background
literature relevant to measurement and control of SOA
advance development projects. Chapter Three presents
examples of a few specific hardware cost estimating




• DEVELOPMENT OF COST ESTIMATING MODELS
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter Three describes the development of four
cost estimating models, including three specific ones
derived exclusively for weapons systems. For each
model the general methodology is highlighted, followed
by sample cost derivations for various cost elements.
The four models examined are:
1. Dodson's cost estimating models for ground combat
surveillance radars (1968).
2. Dodson's cost estimating methods for the
High-Energy Laser Systems Cost Model (1979).
3. The Unmanned Spacecraft Cost Model (1981).
4. The Freiman Analysis of Systems Technique (FAST).
B. GROUND COMBAT SURVEILLANCE RADARS
Dr. E.N. Dodson developed cost estimating methods
for ground combat surveillance (GCS) radars during a
study for the U.S. Army Electronics Command in 1968.
The basic methodology is still applicable to larger,
more current system studies. The goal of Dr. Dodson's
model was to provide Army comptrollers with a model to
evaluate contractor cost estimates. [Ref. 22]
Dodson's GCS radar model considered state of the
art limitations. He stated that the major objective in
the design of GCS radars was to achieve minimum weight
for a specified performance. He used maximum range as
the crude measure of radar performance. To prevent
development and production cost penalties, Dodson's
study indicated that radar design engineers imposed
constraints that radars to be costed should not be




To derive the model, Dodson first collected data on
twenty input variables. He utilized the work breakdown
structure, disaggregating each life cycle element into
a set of functional subsystems. The life cycle
elements were designated as engineering development,
advanced production engineering, and production. The
work breakdown structure for engineering development,
for example, was broken down further into hardware
fabrication and documentation.
In Dodson's next step, he derived a cost estimating
relationship for each category in the work breakdown
structure. The cost estimating functions were derived
through the following basic steps:
1. All known factors between the variables of
interest were specified.
2. Regression equations were developed through a
sequence of known intermediate relationships.
The mechanisms by which an item's physical
characteristics affected raw material quantities
and labor hours were investigated. Engineering
information related the functional variables of
interest to the physical configuration.
3. Standard curve fitting techniques determined the
constants associated with the regression
equations
.
4. The statistical properties of the resulting
correlation were measured.
Dodson claimed the model's results provided no more
than a basis for judgment, since previously confirmed
observations were his only data source. Also, he did
not have enough data to allow estimation of confidence
intervals for his cost predictions.
During the model's development stage, Dodson
gathered cost data from seven different radars. He
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used a price index developed at General Research
Corporation to normalize the dollar price data to 1966
levels. His index assumed an equal breakdown of
engineering labor, production labor, metals and
hardware, and electrical equipment.
Dodson utilized learning curve assumptions to
normalize cost data with respect to different
production quantities. For both complete radar sets
and subsystems he used a slope value of ninety percent.
The GCS cost model was composed of the aggregate
estimating relationships for each element. Dodson
derived production costs first, using the production
cost per unit as an input variable to the engineering
models. No more than two or three input variables were
required to use any one relationship.
The model input variable for production included:
1. Type of design, either pulsed or FMCW.
2. Number of radars in the first production lot.
3. Type of antenna material, either aluminum or
fiber glass.
4. Antenna frontal area in square feet.
5. Center frequency in megahertz.
6. Peak radiated power.
7. Range resolution.
8. Type of presentation, such as handset,
loudspeaker, or plotter board.
9. Total radar set weight.
10. Prime power source, either battery or
motor -generated
.
The only inputs required for engineering
development were cumulative average production cost and
number of development models fabricated.
Dodson derived advanced production engineering
costs from the cumulative average production cost,
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number of prototype models fabricated, and the number
of radars to be produced in the first production lot.
The model was built from actual production cost data
describing the various subsystems. Subsystems included
antennas, scanheads , microwaves, transmitters,
receivers, presentation and control, chassis,
interconnections, casings, and tripods.
Dodson derived a regression equation to estimate
the microwave subsystem of a radar. He defined the
microwave subsystem as a "collection of switching and
waveguide components that carries microwave signals
between the transmitter and antenna, and the antenna
and receiver." [Ref. 23] The key input variables
researched were frequency and peak radiated power. His
final model for microwave cost was derived by adding
the fixed waveguide cost at each frequency to the
power-dependent duplexer (switching) cost. The cost
estimating relationship for pulsed microwaves was found
through regression analysis to be:
$1100 + $9.4 P, with "P" equal to kilowatts.
Dodson collected cost estimates for all production
subsystems, such as the microwave, to obtain total
subsystem cost. Next, he added on the final assembly
and test cost to obtain the cumulative average radar
set cost. The learning curve factor then adjusted the
total cumulative average radar set cost. The prime
power cost was added to the previous sum to obtain the
cumulative average cost for prime power hardware.
Finally, the above total was multiplied by one hundred
five percent to account for the additional cost of
technical data. The result was the cumulative average
radar production cost.
Engineering development costs were calculated by
multiplying the cumulative average radar production
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costs by a factor of three to get the cumulative
average cost for development hardware. He based this
factor of three on the historical trends of the seven
systems studied and consultation with industry experts.
The learning curve factor was applied with the number
of units to obtain the cumulative total development
hardware cost. An additional fifteen percent was added
on to account for the extra cost of documentation.
Dodson's model also provided a hierarchy of
estimating systems, depending on the data available to
the analyst. He recommended all information sources be
exhausted before reliance on estimates based solely on
the regression equations.
The next section provides a brief overview of the
laser system cost model developed by Dodson a decade
later
.
C. HIGH-ENERGY LASER SYSTEMS COST MODEL
In June 1979, Dr. E.N. Dodson completed a study for
the U.S. Air Force to develop a comprehensive life-
cycle cost model for high-energy laser weapons systems.
[Ref. 24] The study accomplished the following
objectives:
1. Created a cost data base for laser weapons
systems
.
2. Developed cost estimating relationships for laser
weapons systems.
3. Integrated the cost estimating relationships into
a life-cycle cost model.
4. Used the cost model to project costs for a number
of weapon system concepts.
Laser weapons systems were required to detect a
target and establish its position. This knowledge
enabled the high-energy laser beams to be properly
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directed. Other system requirements were target
identification, threat assessment, firing doctrine,
kill assessment, plus miscellaneous support equipment.
Dodson relied on the parametric method to develop
cost-estimating relationships for the laser systems.
Since laser systems had never been produced previously,
he used two different approaches to gather the
necessary data. First, he used analogous equipment of
similar physical complexity for analysis. For example,
1 iquid-propellant rocket motors were considered similar
to a laser device's mechanical elements. Also, Dodson
gathered cost estimates for laser subsystems by
currently active contractors in the field.
Additional modeling considerations included an
assessment of mission performance. Performance was
considered a system parameter measured at the
aggregated level of equipment detail. He developed
performance-cost relationships for particular types of
designs at the aggregate level. Dodson 's model was
capable of updating the performance-cost relationships
with changes from new technological developments.
Examples of performance criteria for lasers were radar
detection range, laser power, mission kill probability,
and energy density on target.
Dodson's next consideration in model development
was the synthesis of the individual cost estimating
relationships into the overall cost model. He
recognized they must cover all costs of interest.
Also, costs were defined so that double-counting was
avoided. He also defined all units in dollars of the
same purchasing power.
Dodson based the Work Breakdown Structure for this
study on the life-cycle elements of the Demonstration
and Validation, Full Scale Development, Production, and
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Operations and Support acquisition phases. The first
two phases separated recurring and nonrecurring costs.
Recurring costs represented those costs directly
associated with the fabrication of prototypes.
Nonrecurring costs included all other costs, primarily
engineering design and component testing costs.
All cost relationships were presented in thousands
of 1976 dollars. Provisions for translating those cost
figures into specified future year constant dollars
were included.
The cost elements at the bottom levels of the Work
Breakdown Structure included the hardware associated
with the laser systems with other cost elements such as
system test and evaluation and project management.
Computer subroutines developed by Dodson enabled
the model to carry out types of calculations common to
a number of high-energy laser subsystems. The required
inputs to the high-energy laser systems cost model
included
:
1. Choice of laser type, like chemical or gas
dynamic
.
2. Device output power in watts.
3. Specific power in kilojoules per pound.
4. Number of laser shots per mission load.
5. Shot time in seconds per pulse.
6. Pulse recurrence frequency in pulses per second.
7. Electrical efficiency, consisting of device
output power divided by prime electric power.
8. Output beam diameter in centimeters.
9. Number of turrets per aircraft.
10. Number of adaptive optics actuators per mirror.
11. Number of flight hours.
The model also provided optional inputs to the
user. The user could choose among different procedures
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for calculating fluids costs, avionics costs, or
operations and support costs. For example, for fluids
the user provided the flow rate for each fluid, which
was then combined with cost and lasing time information
to establish total fluid costs. If flow rates were not
available, the model could assimilate the values of
specific power and lasing time with internally-stored
information about the proportions of individual fluids
and their costs, to determine total fluid costs.
Tables with the numerous characteristics for fluids
were provided in the model. Fluids represented a
variety of individual reactants and diluents used in
high energy laser systems. The primary characteristics
contained were cost-per-pound figures.
The High-Energy Laser Systems Cost Model provided
the following outputs:
1. Listing of user provided system inputs.
2. List of Avionics inputs as selected by the user.
3. Intermediate set of results for fluids, including
calculated values of weights and costs for
individual fluids.
4. Printout of fluid-usage parameters for the
individual fluids selected for the case under
study.
5. Listing of the Operating and Support cost
parameters used in calculating these costs.
6. Detailed presentation of life-cycle costs by cost
element in the Work Breakdown Structure.
Costs were presented in thousands of constant-
dollars based on 1976 as the base year. Successive
levels of aggregation were shown in the cost model. The
model also summarized by cost element the individual
cost estimating equations utilized.
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The following example highlights Dodson's model.
The validation phase, one of the four life-cycle
phases, consisted of nonrecurring and recurring costs.
Nonrecurring costs were the sum of these elements:
1. Airborne system costs, which included:
a. Device costs.
b. Power supply costs.
c. Fluid supply costs.
d. Optics, pointing, and tracking costs.
e. Avionics costs.
2. Aircraft modifications costs.
3. System test and evaluation costs.
4. Project management costs.
The device cost for airborne systems was the sum of
individual costs developed for the device,
diffuser /ej ector , and associated instrumentation
controls, along with auxiliary power elements. The
mathematical cost estimating relationship generated for
chemical laser devices was cost equalled 15.309 times
device output power (watts). Device output power was
first scaled to the .44 power.
Dodson's model did not express separately SOA
extension costs. In the next section, the Air Force
Spacecraft model is discussed, with particular emphasis
on the use of engineering design complexity.
D. UNMANNED SPACECRAFT COST MODEL
The 1981 edition of the Space Division Unmanned
Spacecraft Cost Model is considered by the aerospace
industry estimating community as the most widely
applied spacecraft cost estimating tool. [Ref. 25]
The model's purpose is to collect historical
cost data for use in a parametric cost estimating
relationship framework. The model is used to formulate
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more responsive cost estimates for long range planning
studies and future spacecraft systems.
The model is organized into a data matrix. The
matrix is subdivided into areas of activity,
subdivisions of work, and elements of cost. Areas of
activity are specific or general hardware
classifications, such as aerospace ground equipment.
Subdivisions of work indicate processes associated with
more than one hardware item, such as design or
fabrication. Elements of cost represent the standard
cost accounting categories of engineering labor,
material costs, manufacturing overhead, and general and
administrative expenses.
The subdivisions of work are identified as
nonrecurring and recurring costs. A time-phased method
determines the break between the two types of effort.
Nonrecurring costs begin with concept development and
stop when the qualification test of the prototype is
complete
.
Three examples of the areas of activity are the
platform, electrical power supply, and the attitude
control. The platform is part of the spacecraft
structure, and bears the majority of spacecraft dynamic
stress loads. Examples of cost drivers for the
platform are: structure weight, volume, and mass
density. The electrical power supply generates,
converts, and distributes all electrical energy between
spacecraft components. Examples of cost drivers are
electrical power supply weight, battery weight, total
vacuum impulse, and action time.
The attitude control system maintains the
spacecraft in the required orbit. The system can be
stratified into three design categories or two
functional categories of equipment. Cost drivers are
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dry weight, wet weight (with fuel), total impulse,
operating life, angular drift, and altitude.
The ground rules for the cost model are:
1. The model addresses only unmanned earth-orbiting
spacecraft
.
2. Cost estimating relationships are obtained by
relating costs at the subsystem level to physical
and performance characteristics.
3. All cost estimating relationships are based upon
burdened costs, so the model consists of the
total cost through general and administrative
expense cost estimating relationships.
4. A ninety-five percent average learning curve is
used to derive unit costs.
5. The cost estimate is expressed in 1979 constant
dollars
.
Based on the ground rules, starting point cost
estimating relationships are generated. For the three
areas of activities considered earlier, the derived
regression equations were:
1. Platform costs = 7414.46 + 22.6 X, with X
representing platform dry weight in pounds.
2. Electrical Power Supply costs = 360.97 + .0165 X,
with X representing the product of electrical
power supply weight and beginning of life power
in watts.
3. Attitude Control costs for the attitude and
reaction control subsystem = 426.49 + 31.47 X,
with X representing the dry weight of the
attitude and reaction control.
The cost estimating relationships listed above were
derived after examining all program cost data on
scatter diagrams. Next, regression analysis was
performed for several parameters. Further analysis was
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performed on the cost drivers which significantly-
influenced cost. Transformations were performed on
selected variables via multiplication, square roots, or
logarithms to create synthetic variables in an effort
to find the most influential cost drivers. Finally,
the data was stratified for all data points to
determine homogeneity of the points.
Once the cost estimating relationships were
generated, they were normalized to account for
inflation, influences of alternate design concepts and
new technological breakthroughs. In the normalization
process, actual cost data are evaluated with respect to
quantifiable subjective parameters. The parameters
enable the actual cost data to be adjusted to a common
base at the subsystem level. Two subjective parameters
selected were technology carryover and complexity of
design
.
The technology carryover cost factor measures the
state-of-the-art of technology at different periods of
time. The technology carryover measurement scale is
divided into five levels to capture the degree of
engineering learning over time. The five levels are:
1. 1.00: the item is substantially beyond the SOA.
2. .75: the item is slightly beyond the SOA.
3. .50: the item is within the SOA but no
commercial counterpart exists.
4. .25: the item will involve a minor modification
of commercial items.
5. .10: the item will be procured off-the-shelf.
Programs can be examined by the Unmanned Spacecraft
Cost Model by the complexity of design cost factor
also. The first step is to identify subsystem
operational criteria which could relate cost to the
degree of complexity. Descriptors must be chosen to
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realistically assess the operational criteria. Each
operational criterion is ranked against a base value of
100 percent. The evaluation is compared to the
subsystem complexity factor matrix. The relative
ranking indicates the degree to which the operational
criteria affects the costs of developing the subsystem.
To obtain the normalization cost factors, a
comprehensive study of industry experts was conducted.
A weighting scheme was devised to generate one
normalization factor for each subsystem from the
composite of technology carryover, complexity of
design, and inflation factors. Each subsystem's raw
cost data points from the initial cost estimating
relationships were divided by the composite
normalization factor to yield a set of normalized cost
data points. The normalized cost will always be less
than the initial point design cost estimate.
The normalized cost estimating relationships
enable the cost analyst to perform trade-off studies
for near-term conceptual programs. They permit
calculation of costs for more specific spacecraft
programs. The Unmanned Spacecraft Cost Model via an
appendix provides a summary of all the normalized cost
estimating relationships.
The next section outlines the basic concepts behind
the Freiman Analysis of Systems Technique (FAST),
developed by Frank Freiman. [Ref.26]
E. FREIMAN ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS TECHNIQUE (FAST)
Freiman developed the FAST parametric cost
estimating system to evaluate the cost impact of
variations in schedule or design. Freiman's system
differs from the conventional parametric models, such
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as the Unmanned Spacecraft Cost Model, in the following
ways
:
1. It quantifies technological phenomena underlying
design which cause costs to vary with size and
design
.
2. It reduces need for lengthy historical design
versus cost records.
3. It allows synthesized data points to be used for
initial development estimates.
The FAST methodology involves analysis of the
fundamental concepts behind technology variance with
cost per pound. Freiman found advanced SOA
technologies provide more energy per unit of design
mass than those within the SOA. The same performance
for SOA extensions can be accomplished with less
equipment mass. Freiman' s theory is that to advance a
design mass, more energy per pound must be utilized.
The FAST model estimates costs by its class of
technology. Its seven basic types, in hierarchial
order, are electronic, electrical, heat, motion,
mechanical control, containment, and support. Freiman
also used the weighted average level of the technology
with the degree of performance desired to categorize
equipment types by design mass components. His five
basic types of design masses are:
1. Energy Conversion Mass - converts one energy form
to another.
2. Design Overhead Mass - added due to
inefficiencies of design.
3. Application Mass - required to transfer energy.
4. Dimensional Mass - required for physical coverage
of a system.
5. Conditional Mass - required for environmental or
personnel safety reasons.
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Based upon the design mass and technology type,
FAST can quantify cost per pound of the electronic
system being estimated. Via computerized mathematical
equations the cost estimating relationships among cost,
weight, and technological complexity can be expressed.
FAST also simulates the thought processes of
successful managers. FAST ' s methodology is derived
from the way managers intuitively assess the cost of
SOA advancements. FAST is designed to simulate
behavioral responses ranging from establishing the data
base to exercising "what-if" capabilities.
FAST systems feature the following:
1. Accept tailored inputs from varied design and
manufacturing circumstances.
2. Project funding requirements via graphic and
alpha-numeric displays.
3. Provide risk measurement through display of cost
uncertainties for each cost segment.
4. List detailed complexity values for commercial
and industrial items.
5. Are user-friendly, unlike the more specific cost
models such as the ground surveillance radar cost
model
.
FAST is useful as a check for conceptual stage cost
estimates, although it must be calibrated for each
individual user. Tables 1 and 2 represent sample
outputs for the FAST cost estimating model for
electronic equipment. Table 1 is divided into five
primary sections, broken down as follows:
1. Total estimated costs of the line item, with
subtotals for engineering, production, and
installation costs. If necessary, costs for
schedule delay could be included.
2. Cost uncertainty distributions, for risk
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evaluation. Three confidence intervals, ranging
from seventy to ninety percent are shown for the
engineering, production, and installation
subtotals. Note the total assumes the covariance
equals one.
Characteristics of the equipment's energy
sources. The primary energy required is
expressed in kilowatts, while secondary items
such as pressure and temperature are also
summarized. A synthetic FAST energy variable is
calculated and shown below the primary and
secondary characteristics.
Production cost data, using average unit costs.
Figures for the total estimated production costs,
manufacturing costs, and the theoretical forecast
are shown. In this example manufacturing costs
are the same as production costs, due to lack of
beginning work in process inventory.
Input data. The factors actually entered by the
cost estimator are presented. Among the inputs
are :
a. PRJGLOB: Overall project global inputs are
shown. This line requires an escalation
control factor for inflation, the year of
economics to be used, learning curve factor,
and a cost multiplier index.
b. FILE and FORMAT input different types of
system options.
c. GLOB - Further global inputs are included,
specifically the platform specification
level, engineering design mass type, year of
technology to be used in production, and a
weighted energy value based on kilowatts,
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british thermal units, pressure, and
temperature
.
d. WTVOL: Weight and volume factors, along with
their weighted values, are shown.
e. MXLINE: Manufacturing complexity values for
the production of the line item are given.
f. PCOST, ECOST, ICOST : Inputs for basic costs
of production, engineering and installation,
along with quantities and the year of
economics, are shown.
g. PSCHD, ESCHD, ISCHD : Values for start and
completion dates, complexity values, and
skill levels are presented for production,
engineering, and installation schedule
factors
.
h. PLOH, ELOH, ILOH : Production, engineering,
and installation material, manufacturing
overhead, labor, and indirect labor factors,
along with an aggregate labor rate for each
phase, is presented.
Table 2 shows the cost distribution by total labor
hours for engineering, production, and installation.
Also, a production profile graph compares the
cumulative funding for the project against the
estimated cumulative expenditures, by quarters from
1984 to 1991. The expenditures indicate actual
disbursement of manufacturing costs, while funding
indicate the budgeted figures.
F. SUMMARY
This section highlighted features of four different
cost estimation models. Chapter Four presents the case
study description of Litton Applied Technology's cost
59


































































BRITISH TH. UNIT (SBTU )
PRESSURE (PSI) (SPRESS)















PRODUCTION COST DATA ••••«
average unit costs based on:
:al production cost manufacturing cost
26,029.03 26,029.03
THEORETICAL FPCOS:
40, 466 . 78
DATA •••••
ESCAL GECON FPIR LCURVE rvr •" 7
PRJGLCB 1. 000 1989 OCT 0. 900 ^ n ^
TYPE SYSTEM RERUN REM BOX
r ; -_t D
ALL COS'I UNCERT LOHMAT INPUT FG RAFH FDE T
FORMAT 1
PLTFM EN":ype matval TYEAR TEN".'
A
j_
GLOB 1.300 70 .000 1.00 1988 K\i . BTU
.
prs.tz::. :. 2c:
WT WTFAC VOL VOLFAC
WTVOL 1, 060.70* 350. CO 24 . 15* 100 .00
PMX MXTYPE ELWT ELMX STMT STXX
HXLINE 0.200 4.280* 0.0 0.000 0.0 0.03
PCOST PQTY PECON FOAK
PCOST 1, 301.45* 50. 1989 1 . 000
PSTART PFIN PSCHDX PRDMX PYEARC PDISC
PSCHO DEC. 1989 NOV. 1991* 100.00 3. 327* 1989* NONE
PMATL PMOH PLABOR PLOH PLRATE
PLOH 0.30 0. 00 0.34* 1. 06* 11.75
ECOST EQTY EECCN EMX ENEW
ECOST 797. 19* 5 . 2 1989 0. 850 0. 700
ESTART EFIN ESCHDX ELEVEL EYEARC EDISC
ESCHD JUN. 198 8 OCT. 1989 121.43* 0. 700 1989* NONE
EMAIL EMCH ELABOR ELOH ELRATE
ELCH 0.35 0. 00 0.26* 1.48* 22.55
ICOST IQTY IECON IMX
ICOST 519.84* 50. 1989 1.250
ISTART IFIN ISCHDX ILEVEL IYEARC IDISC
ISCHD JUL. 1990 FEB. 1991* 80. 00 1. 000 1989* NONE




























COST DISTRIBUTION • ••••
PRODUCTION INSTALLATION














































15 -b • basic exp,















••••* ESTIMATED PROJECT PROFILE *****
(COST IN THOUSANDS)
MONTH YEAR CUM. FUNDINGS CUM. EXPENDITURES
OCT 1989 316.3 0.0
JAN 1990 816.3 66.4
APR 1990 816.3 321.2
JUL 1990 816.3 628.5
OCT 1990 1,295.3 899.2
JAN 1991 1,295.3 1,09 5.5
APR 1991 1,295.3 1,215.4
JUL 1991 1,295.3 1,276.5
OCT 1991 1,301.5 1,299.9
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IV. DESCRIPTION OF L ITTON APPLIED TECHNOLOGY'S COST
ESTIMATING_SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes Litton Applied Technology's
cost estimating system for development projects which
extend technology beyond the SOA . This case study will
primarily focus on the AN/ALR-67 Radar Warning
Receiver, also called the Advanced Countermeasures
Control and Warning System. The chapter is divided
into the following sections:
1. Litton 's background in development of radar
warning receivers.
2. Description of key physical and performance
characteristics of the AN/ALR-67 Radar Warning
Receiver
.
3. Litton's pricing and estimation system.
4. Cost estimation methodology for derivation of
direct costs.
5. Delineation of actual costs incurred by Litton
from development through initial production for
the AN/ALR-67 Radar Warning Receiver.
B. BACKGROUND FOR RADAR WARNING RECEIVERS
1 . General Background
Litton Applied Technology is a division of
Litton's Electronic Warfare Systems Group. Currently
located in south San Jose, California, Litton Applied
Technology employs approximately 1800 people in the
research, design, manufacture, and support of defense
electronics systems. Besides radar warning receivers,
they also specialize in integrated electronic warfare
systems, space and strategic defense systems, and
flight training and operational simulation systems.
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Applied Technology actually was an independent company
until 1983, when it became a division of Litton.
2
.
History of Radar Warning Receivers
Applied Technology first became involved with
radar warning receivers in 1965. The concept of radar
warning receivers was initiated by a special Air Force
task force commissioned to develop methods to counter
Soviet surface-to-air missiles. In 1965, North Vietnam
developed a complex air defense system closely
coordinated through the use of communications and
radar, based on Soviet technology. The Air Force's
research committee reviewed new concepts for warning
and jamming equipment which could counter the North
Vietnamese air defense threat. In November 1965,
Applied Technology received a six million dollar
production contract for 500 AN/APR-25 Radar Warning
Receivers from the USAF Sacramento Air Material Area.
The contract was Applied Technology's first major
production contract, since previous defense experience
was limited to technology applications for
intelligence programs, where large production runs
consisted of only ten units.
The design philosophy for the AN/APR-25
centered on gathering as much signal information as
possible. Crystal-video detection techniques were used
in the threat bands to determine the hostile
equipment's relative direction.
In the late 1960 's Applied Technology updated
the AN/APR-25 with the AN/APR-35 Radar Warning
Receiver. New technology such as automatic time/video
correlation circuits and a new superheterodyne analysis
receiver were added. Also, improvements in operator
interfaces were added to the equipment to enable the
Electronic Warfare Officer to instantaneously
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communicate to the pilot which directions surface-to-
air missiles were fired from.
The next generation of radar warning receivers
was introduced in 1970, based on the new Soviet threat
to the Mediterranean region. The AN/ALR-45 became the
first digital system to incorporate hybrid
microcircui ts using digital logic and clock drivers.
This generation's design philosophy emphasized the need
for sorting analysis of emitter types and
prioritization of lethal pulses. Non-lethal threat
information could now be discarded.
In 1971 Applied Technology, in a fundamental
change, became deeply involved in computer design
evolving from analog circuit design. In 1972 the
company developed the Applied Technology Advanced
Computer (ATAC) specifically for electronic warfare.
This computer was capable of being reprogrammed at a
squadron level. The ATAC computer's volume was 96
cubic inches, with power consumption 45 watts, and an
input/output rate of 1.25 megawords per second.
In 1975, the ATAC computer was used in the
development of the AN/ALR-67 threat warning program.
Integrated power management systems now collect and
analyze multiple threats to enable optimum jamming.
The AN/ALR-67 was developed due to the Navy's need for
increased speed and prioritized threat warning
information. The AN/ALR-67 is now deployed on the F/A-
18A, CF-18, F-14A, F-14B, A-6E, A-6F, AND AV-8B
aircraft
.
The next generation of radar warning receivers
to be fully deployed will be the AN/ALR-74 threat
warning systems, as of 1987. The AN/ALR-67 is
completing the full-scale development phase.
66
C. PHYSICAL AND PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
The AN/ALR-67 Radar Warning Receiver's primary-
function is to notify the radar operator of the
presence of threatening signals. The AN/ALR-67 is
designed to inform the pilot of how many hostile radar
systems are active in his flight area. The AN/ALR-67
identifies the type and relative location of each
threatening radar signal.
The most important performance criterion of the
AN/ALR-67 is response speed. The AN/ALR-67 is designed
to allow the pilot time for evasive action against
potential threats. Also, the radar warning receiver's
response time is quick enough to provide accurate
relative direction information on hostile threats
immediately following aircraft maneuvers.
To be effective, the AN/ALR-67 must transmit the
critical parameters of the threat to the aircraft
jamming system in digital form. The effectiveness of
the jammer's electronic countermeasures depends on the
AN/ALR-67's receiver acquisition time.
The second performance criterion for the AN/ALR-67
is threat identification. The radar warning receiver
characterizes hostile signals by their modulation
characteristics and range of RF frequency operation.
RF frequency pulse trains often occur simultaneously,
so the AN/ALR-67 must be capable of unambiguous signal
identification.
The AN/ALR-67 is also designed to look at selective
frequency bands so high duty signals can be analyzed
independently without interference. The pilot receives
information from the AN/ALR-67 Radar Warning Receiver
by visual displays on a three-inch diameter cathode ray
tube in the cockpit. The pilot receives data as
following from the AN/ALR-67.
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1. Relative direction of each signal to an accuracy
of 15 degrees to 30 degrees.
2. Indication of each signal's strength.
3. Identification by symbols of specific radar
types
.
The design of the AN/ALR-67 Radar Warning Receiver
is constrained by three practical factors: volume,
power consumption, and cost. The allocated volume for
the radar warning receivers has remained constant since
1965. The increase in customer requirements and the
continued development of electronics microwave
techniques has led to high package density, which
imposes the constraints on power consumption. Cost
constraints must be met through system tradeoffs. A
six decibel difference in receiver sensitivity
requirements could mean the difference between
development of crystal video receivers, or more
expensive wideband superheterodyne receivers.
Processing of signals through the ATAC computer has
replaced human interpretation of audio and visual
information. The AN/ALR-67 has a tangential receiver
sensitivity between -50 dBm and -60 dBm, at a 10 -MHZ
video bandwidth. System sensitivity experiences losses
due to cabling and filtering.
Search speed limitations place another constraint
on the AN/ALR-67. The ratio of the RF frequency search
band to the receiver instantaneous bandwidth determines
the length of time it takes a receiver to intercept a
potential signal.
The most recent advances in microprocessor
technology enable radar warning receivers to have each
element of the distributed receiver system to be
controlled independently by a computer. The AN/ALR-67
was the first radar warning receiver to control its
system operations via computer software.
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The individual subsystem components of the AN/ALR-
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D. LITTON APPLIED TECHNOLOGY'S COST ESTIMATING SYSTEM
Litton Applied Technology has developed a complex
matrix structure to manage its proposal estimating
system for government contracts such as the AN/ALR-67
Radar Warning Receiver. Its approach is designed to
accommodate government procurement regulations,
compliance with the Cost Accounting Standards, specific
customer requirements, and its own company policies.
The stated goal of their cost estimating system is to
be systematic and consistent.
Litton's Proposal Pricing and Estimating Manual
defines its five primary tasks as:
1. Define requirements in a manner which allows
specific work elements to be performed.
2. Develop a work breakdown structure and cost
matrix compatible with the cost collection
system of the cost elements. The elements must
be measurable and definable through task
descriptions which are consistent with the
statement of work requirements.
3. Identify and develop significant milestones and
schedules for each work element and a realistic
program schedule.
4. Prepare data to serve as the basis for the review
of all cost estimates.
5. Review and present the related cost experience,
historical data, and detailed cost estimates.
The Vice President of Business and Financial
Operations has overall responsibility for Litton
Applied Technology's cost estimation system. The two
primary subordinates who assist him are the Director of
Proposal Cost Estimating and Analysis and the Manager
of Proposal Operations.
The Director of Proposal Cost Estimating and
Analysis is primarily responsible for the development
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of cost proposals for division products. His division
must establish and maintain effective cost estimating
tools and techniques. He also ensures cost proposals
comply with customers' cost proposal requirements and
regulations. The division must support internal cost
reviews and establish the budget baselines for the
project cost control. The direct planning, monitoring,
and prioritization of all cost proposal activities are
conducted under his cognizance.
Litton Applied Technology's corporate guidelines
hold the Director, Cost Estimating and Analysis
directly accountable for:
1. Formulation of guidelines for all proposal
pricing preparation and reviews in accordance
with division policy.
2. Development of overall division cost proposal
plans. He must define an schedule the
prerequisite support from line management. The
plans must cover the statement of work, basic
assumptions, cost data, and problem
identification and resolution. The conducting of
reviews with line management on major cost
proposals is included within this task.
3. Support of cost proposals during the customer's
evaluation cycle. He must develop and establish
negotiation cost positions. He also assigns and
approves the members of the negotiating team.
The director ensures cost updates and cost
disclosures are in accordance with customer
regulations
.
4. Review current division cost performance trends
to ensure that such performance is considered in
all proposals.
5. Direct resources dedicated to the development and
maintenance of the pricing data base. He is also
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accountable for implementing advanced estimating
techniques and systems for the division's
proposals
.
6. Support design-to-cost analysis projects of the
division .
The Manager of Proposal Operations is accountable
for managing Litton Applied Technology's capability to
respond to customer requests for cost estimates. He
ensures the division cost proposals are complete,
accurate, and minimize cost risk. He serves as a key
interface with the functional line departments, program
office, senior management, auditors, and customers.
Finally, he must review and approve all formal cost and
price proposals for content and conformance with
government regulations, public law, and customer
requirements
.
The cost proposal cycle for Litton Applied
Technology consists of thirteen distinct steps. The
individual steps, in successive order, are:
1. Receipt and acceptance of the customer's request
for proposal
.
2. Assign a proposal team manager.
3. Issue the proposal authorization to proceed
order
.
4. Assemble the proposal team, with representatives
from Engineering, Quality Assurance, Operations,
Contract Administration, and Proposal Cost
Estimating and Analysis.
5. Conduct proposal team planning meetings. The
team must establish a tentative program schedule
and develop the work breakdown structure. The
bid matrix, which designates the individuals
responsible for the cost estimate for every
single element, is promulgated.
6. Brief senior management of the team's plans at a
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one-hour kickoff meeting.
7. Review the proposal strategy and technical
approach at previously defined Intervals.
8. Identify all material requirements.
9. Collect and analyze the cost estimates.
10. Conduct final management review.
11. Prepare the proposal submittal volume.
12. Submit the proposal to the customer.
13. Complete audits and negotiations by the customer.
The key member in this matrix concept for cost
estimating is the proposal analyst assigned from the
Proposal Cost Estimating and Analysis Division. He is
responsible for the compilation and analysis of the
estimated costs submitted by the personnel designated
in the bid-matrix structure. Also, he performs "make-
or-buy-analysis" on selected high dollar value parts.
The general cost estimating approach by the
proposal team Is the "bottoms-up" cost engineering
method. The bottoms-up method is utilized for every
proposal, from development of new designs to full-scale
production cost proposals. The key steps the team
performs for cost analysis are:
1. For existing design configurations, the proposal
analyst retrieves a computerized bill of material
from the on-line material pricing system.
2. For new designs, the responsible functional
organization will generate a bill of material and
send it to the proposal analyst.
3. The proposal analyst develops a priced bill of
material with support from the Procurement
Material Pricing Department for inclusion in the
cost proposal
.
4. The functional organizations submit their direct
and indirect labor estimates to the proposal
manager for review.
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5. All functional cost estimates are given to the
proposal analyst to create the preliminary cost
roll-up
.
6. Preliminary cost reviews with senior management
are conducted.
7. The proposal analyst receives the cost review
results. He next compares them with the cost
history on similar programs for reasonableness.
8. All team members review the revised cost
estimates to ensure they are factual, verifiable,
complete, and support the proposed amounts.
9. The proposal manager and proposal analyst brief
the company executives at the Final Management
View to defend their cost estimates.
For every stage in the cost proposal development
process, checkoff sheets are generated. Signatures by
the responsible individuals are obtained to indicate
completion for every step. The proposal analyst
primarily verifies the functional groups' cost
estimates for labor hours and material quantity. On
production contract proposals with little risk, the
proposal analyst generates the cost estimate himself
based strictly on historical data. Company officials
estimate that an average of three complete cost
estimate reviews are conducted before final approval.
E. COST ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY FOR DERIVATION OF
DIRECT COSTS
Litton Applied Technology's Cost Estimation and
Pricing Manual defines direct material as the cost of
material used in making a product which is directly
associated with a change in the product. Litton's
direct material base is comprised of raw materials,
purchased parts, and subcontracted items. For raw
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materials, a raw stock factor is applied to the total
estimated material base to account for these costs. In
their system raw materials which require further
processing are treated as indirect costs.
When budgetary estimates, also called ROM (rough
order of magnitude) estimates, are requested for
supplied of existing products, they are based on the
most recent firm estimates of the same or similar
items. The prior estimate is adjusted by the analyst
for quantity differences and the degree of complexity.
An annual escalation factor is added to the prior
material estimate to account for period of performance
differences. The difference in quantity is adjusted by
utilization of a ninety-five percent improvement curve.
The proposal manager, assisted by the functional
engineering team members, provide the complexity factor
for material estimates to the cost analyst.
Follow-on spare parts estimating is based on Litton
Applied Technology's on-line computerized material
pricing system. The source data for the computerized
system represents the most current configuration for
released part lists. Proposal analysts have the
capability to extract the purchase order history of
selected spare parts dating back to 1975. The analysts
incorporate this information to the priced bill of
material. The computerized on-line system can generate
a priced bill of material by either the individual
assembly or part number, or a consolidated group of
part numbers. The computer's primary files from which
the bills of material are generated are the engineering
configuration file and the manufacturing configuration
file.
The Proposal Material Audit Report is Litton's name
for the computer generated list of material prices
based on the purchase order history. Litton's policy
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for high dollar value/high usage parts dictates a
preference for current vendor quotes instead of sole
reliance on previous history. Their normal procedures
mandate at least three competitive quotes must be
obtained. Follow-on spare parts are also adjusted in
quantity by Litton's ninety-five percent improvement
curve. Escalation factors for the period of
performance differences also are included.
If there is no previous history of a material
purchase, the proposal analyst requests via a standard
material pricing request form that the Purchasing
Material Pricing Department obtain vendor quotes. The
functional proposal team members provide the physical
description to the proposal analyst.
Estimates of material requirements for the SOA
development projects, such as the conceptual
exploration phase of the AN/ALR-67 Radar Warning
System, are based on the "bottoms-up" system
engineering approach. The cognizant engineer at the
lowest level of the work breakdown structure develops
the bill of materials after detailed analysis of the
proposed design configuration specifications. The
responsible engineer provides the quantity, part
number, and description of the required materials in
accordance with the bid task matrix instructions. The
required bill of material is passed to the proposal
analyst via the Material Cost Estimate Detail Form.
The material requirements for new developments are
based on:
1. Similarity to existing equipment.
2. Vendor catalog items.
The priced bill of material based on "similar to"
equipment is adjusted by a qualitative complex factor.
For items never previously purchased, the complexity
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factor is determined by a consensus among members of
the proposal team.
Once the dollar estimates for the material
estimates are gathered, the proposal analyst next
develops the Principle Items List. This list will
include a previously determined numerical sampling of
high dollar/high usage items. The written rationale
for each item must include:
1 . Part number
.
2. Known or anticipated source.
3. Total quantity.
4. Unit and total price.
5. Competition status.
6. Basis for establishing the source.
7. Determination for reasonableness of cost.
The proposal analyst justifies cost reasonableness
for the selected items based on inputs from the
Procurement Material Pricing Department. The proposal
analyst next presents the list for approval to the
proposal and business area managers during formal cost
input coordination meetings.
The Direct Labor Narrative Statement is another
document required for the cost estimate of the
proposal. Upon completion, both the functional
proposal team representative and the cognizant
functional director are required to sign it. The
document should show enough detail to separate labor
for each distinct operation. Each operation is
identified by an engineering cost center and labor
category. The estimates for direct labor costs must
consider whether prior relatable efforts exist or if no
verifiable labor cost data can be found. The estimates




For prior relatable efforts, the copy of the
previous cost report is attached if the estimated hours
bid are identical or directly related in terms of
equivalent technical complexity. The proposal cost
analyst will review the incurred labor hour costs on
sample task work orders to audit the validity and
accuracy of the prior related task.
The proposal analyst must search for more detailed
evidence if the prior relatable effort is of varying
complexity to the present effort. The labor hours
currently estimated are compared directly to a similar
effort for which verification of incurred hours exist.
The proposal analyst compares the present effort to the
prior related task by developing a ratio based on the
relative technical complexities of the two tasks. The
percentage difference must be explained by identifiable
documentary evidence such as the following:
1. Differences in number of units to be assembled.
2. Variance in assembly component count.
3. Differences in number and type of cables.
4. Differences in testing requirements.
5. Comparison of technical and performance
differences
.
6. Size or weight differences.
To achieve consistency on the Direct Labor
Narrative Report, the prior effort is assigned a
complexity base value of one. The narrative portion
should specifically cite specification paragraphs which
account for the difference in the plus or minus
technical requirement.
If no background verifiable data can be found, the
narrative should explain how the direct labor costs are
derived. Sources such as conceptual estimating guides
should be indicated by title; for example, "Electronic
Cost Estimating Data", by Fred Hartmeyer. The basis
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for level of effort proposal estimating should also be
stated. The reasons or rationale for labor cost
estimates which are purely judgmental is also
documented by the proposal analyst.
The cost accounting system for Litton, incorporated
in the computerized on-line system, provides
historical data at the work order level, task level,
and project level by expense center code, for direct
labor costs. An annual labor escalation factor
consistent with that utilized in direct labor rate
projections is applied to estimates based on prior
related efforts.
The historical data utilized for direct labor
estimating includes the following:
1. Direct Labor Hour Audit Report: shows
manufacturing work order closures for the latest
two years by assembly number. A ratio for unit
average hours by expense center code for each
part number is derived by summation of the
manufacturing work order closure hours.
2. Proposal Direct Hours Report: shows two years of
labor hours data for all subassemblies in the
requested assembly. This report is utilized for
manufacturing related tasks.
3. Material Work Order History Cost Estimating
Summary Report: summarizes total unit hours by
expense center code for the requested assembly
which Litton will locally manufacture.
4. Contract Cost Status Report: provides, for non-
manufacturing tasks, the historical data base
for similar tasks.
Litton Applied Technology's methodology for direct
labor estimates for development programs is similar to
the process described earlier for all labor hours
estimates. The only added feature for development
80
program estimates is an increased emphasis on
documentation via narrative analysis for complexity
adjustments. The proposal analyst applies appropriate
direct labor hour bid rates. The proposed bid rates
are determined by examining the period of performance
of the program plan and arriving at the midpoint of the
effort. Historical bid rates are determined by
dividing the quarterly total dollars expended by the
quarterly total labor hours incurred for each expense
center code.
The other direct costs included in every Litton
development or production program estimate are:
1. Vendor Nonrecurring and Tooling: These represent
the vendor costs associated with development,
start-up, and tooling costs to produce and
deliver equipment. The basis for this estimate
consists of written vendor quotations or
historical data such as prior purchase orders or
project cost reports.
2. Travel: Travel estimates consist of
transportation and subsistence costs directly
associated with the program estimate.
3. Field Service Differential: These costs include
additional compensation over and above base
salary expenses and per diem, which serve as an
incentive to field support personnel on
assignment
.
4. Service Centers: The three service centers are
Reprographic Services, Programming Services, and
Word Processing Services. The cost estimates use
hourly billing rates based on forecasted
utilization and operational costs for the service
center. The costs are estimated either by prior
verifiable experience or the estimated number of
hours the service will take.
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Litton Applied Technology also uses estimates of
direct labor hours in their derivation of indirect pool
costs. The six indirect pools are:
1. Material overhead: This rate is determined by
the ratio of annual total indirect costs for each
expense center code divided by the total dollar
value of the material base, including scrap and
raw stock.
2. Fringe benefits: This rate is calculated by the
ratio of annual fringe benefit expense costs
divided by the total division labor dollars
expended
.
3. Sunnyvale plant overhead and Georgia operations
overhead: Both pool rates are based on total
plant overhead dollars expended annually divided
by total division direct labor dollars plus their
associated fringe benefit costs.
4. Field service overhead: This rate is based on
total annual overhead costs divided by direct
labor costs.
5. General and administrative expenses: These
expenses consist of independent research and
development, bid and proposal cost estimating,
executive staff, general accounting, resource
allocation and control, and defense systems
business development costs. The rate is based on
total expenses divided by the forecasted total
costs sum allocable to contracts.
Besides the indirect rates, direct factors such as
manufacturing overtime premium, material raw stock, and
manufacturing and engineering support services are also
allocated. Engineering support functions include
software engineering and development, and engineering
design support. Manufacturing support services include
operations control, shipping, and the test directorate
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staff. The rate for these functions is based on the
ratio of the six month historical average of direct
labor hours for each service.
F. ACTUAL COSTS FOR THE AN/ALR-67 RADAR WARNING
RECEIVER
Litton Applied Technology received its first
contract in 1975 under a cost plus fixed fee basis from
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM, Washington, D.C., to develop the
AN/ALR-67 Radar Warning Receiver. Due to budget
constraints at the Navy level, this initial concept
exploration contract was cancelled three times between
1975 and 1979. During the interim periods Litton
Applied Technology utilized their own funds to continue
the development with a skeleton force of five to ten
people. Litton estimates they spent $400,000 of their
own funds during 1976 on the AN/ALR-67 development,
with the hope of being reimbursed. The initial
contract amount was for $680,000. Contract
modifications increased this amount to $1,000,000
before funds were temporarily shut down in 1976.
Subsequent modifications, eventually totalling 100
altogether, increased the final development cost total
to $6,530,000 under the contracted amount. Litton
Applied Technology actually spent $10,541,541,
incurring a $4,000,000 cost overrun. Ninety-four
percent of the development effort occurred between 1975
and 1978, with the remainder of the effort continuing
through 1980. A total of seven prototype models were
built between 1975 and 1980.
The next contract covered the time frame from
October 1982 to December 1985. This contract called
for limited production of 43 ALR-67 systems. For this
production start-up endeavor a fixed price incentive
type contract was negotiated, placing more of the cost
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risk on Litton Applied Technology. The ceiling price
on this contract wa $46,600,000 for the 43 systems.
Since 1985, a full scale production contract has
been awarded by the Navy for 200 additional systems at
a total price of $103,000,000. This contract is still
ongoing
.
Table 4 presents a budget and actual expenditure
summary for contract N00019-75-C-0390 . The actual
development costs were broken into:
Software design $ 1,300,000
Hardware design $ 5,100,000
Hardware fabrication $ 2,200,000
Data $ 1,100,000
Test requirements $ 800,000
TOTAL $10,500,000
The actual costs for the limited production
contract were:
Productionizing $11,400,000




G. PREVIEW OF NEXT CHAPTER
Chapter Five analyzes the cost data through a brief
variance analysis of the listed cost elements. It also
includes a summary of the findings from the case study
interviews, as well as an examination of possible new






FUNDING AND EXPENDITURE SUMMARY
AUGUST 19 3 7 (MONTH ENDING 3/2 3/37)
EXPENDED
:lin § DESCRIPTION FUNDED TC) DATE
3e:ti:n z
DEVELOPMENT $6,530 ,000 $10,541. 541
OPTION $1,255,566 $ 1,332. 512
3E DTI 3N F
C002 PGSE $3,514,134 $ 3,563.,040
0003 3 PARES /HARM $1,675,363 $ 1,711 ,861
0007 GSERDS $ 332,054 $ 309 ,529
0024 ENG. SUPPORT $1,749 ,008 $ 1,773 ,548
00 2 5 TEST SUPPORT $4,252 ,944 $ 4,233 ,552
0025 ENG. SERV/SYS S/W $3,527 ,127 $ 3,733 ,792
0027 FIELD ENG. SUPT $ 200,000 $ 194 ,326
0023 TEST SUPT (M-lDEMO) $1,546,770 $ 1,304 ,389
0023 ENS. SERV/SYS S/W $2 ,340,000 9 2 ,055 ,206
0030 7/ A- 13 A INTGRTN $ 146,607 5 148 ,464
31 F/A-13A I/F
TOTAL
$ 520,550 $ 471 ,000
$27 ,640,773 6 -51,427 ,760
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V. CASE ANALYSIS AND FUTURE TRENDS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an analysis of the cost
estimating methodology used by Litton Applied
Technology. Emerging trends in measuring and
controlling SOA costs for the future are discussed.
Specifically, this chapter provides the following:
1. A variance analysis of the AN/ALR-67 Radar
Warning Receiver development program.
2. An overall analysis of Litton Applied
Technology's cost estimating system.
3. A discussion of current concerns and directions
within the cost estimating field, based on case
study
.
4. Thoughts about the roles cost estimators must
assume in the future.
5. Comparison of Litton's cost estimating process to
the current direction of the cost estimating
field.
B. VARIANCE ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OF THE
AN/ALR-67 RADAR WARNING RECEIVER
The majority of cost overruns for the current life
cycle of the AN/ALR-67 Radar Warning Receiver occurred
in the conceptual exploration period between 1975 and
1980. Variance analysis of the development costs
indicates a cost overrun of $4,011,541, or 61.4
percent. The second largest contributor to the total
cost variance was engineering services and systems
software support, which overran the funded amount by
5.8 percent, or $206,665. Schedule variances could not
be calculated from the data provided, since the
category for funded costs was not further subdivided
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into budgeted cost of work scheduled and budgeted cost
of work performed.
From discussions with company officials [Ref. 27],
the primary reasons for the cost variances in the
development phase were:
1. The sporadic nature of government funding.
During the years 1975-1979, the project was
stopped three times by the Navy due to funding
constraints. The miscellaneous work stoppage and
startup costs associated with this type of
uncertainty were not completely compensated for
by the Navy.
2. Poor software cost estimating. The AN/ALR-67 was
the first Litton Applied Technology system to
incorporate extensive software technology.
Several cost analysts stated the amount of labor
hours estimated to write the lines of code for
the software development programs were
significantly underestimated. There were no
analogous programs to refer to for cost history
comparisons. Litton Applied Technology does not
utilize any generic cost estimation model in
software or hardware.
3. Inadequate definition of the work breakdown
structure. During the years 1975-1980, the work
breakdown structure was developed by painstaking
manual methods , rather than use of the current
on-line drafting capability. Litton engineers
found it difficult during the initial development
phase to segregate the AN/ALR-67 prototype models
into clearly defined lower level elements. This
lack of definition led to problems of
underallocation of funds as actual costs began
rolling in.
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4. Inflation and its effects on material costs. The
years 1975-1980 were periods of rapid price
increase for many defense electronics materials.
As delays due to work stoppage mounted in these
initial years, original material estimates became
outdated. As a result, material prices were
notably higher when purchased at the point of
usage
.
5. Effect of experience. The various work stoppages
during the development phase hindered the
learning curve progression to an unmeasurable
degree. As a result, more rework than originally
planned occurred, especially in software
development
.
6. Numerous contract modifications. Litton budget
analysts estimated that 300 modifications due to
engineering change proposals were added to the
AN/ALR-67 development. These modifications
accounted for the funded increase to $6,500,000
from the original contract amount of $680,000.
Most modifications involved increased integration
of circuits to provide added performance within
the same size constraints.
7. Schedule pressure. During 1978, considerable
pressure was exerted by the Navy to accelerate
fabrication of the engineering development
models. This pressure led to an unplanned
increase in the number of workers and an increase
in rework, both of which contributed to cost
increases
.
8. Lack of formal controls. Litton Applied
Technology did not have a well-documented control
system of checklists and unplanned audits in the
period 1975-1980. Internal investigations of
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variance were not available for review for
contracts during this period. This era also
predated the DOD procurement reform measures of
the mid-1980's, which required more stringent
control systems by government contractors.
C. OVERALL ANALYSIS OF LITTON APPLIED TECHNOLOGY'S
COST ESTIMATING SYSTEM
This analysis of the cost estimating system for the
AN/ALR-67 Radar Warning Receiver and Litton Applied
Technology is based on the six managerial subsystem
characteristics of the Katz and Rosenzweig Model, which
are environmental, technical, goals and values,
psychological, managerial, and structural. [Ref. 27]
1 . Environmental
The environment which influences Litton Applied
Technology is much different in 1987 than it was during
1980, the end of the development period. In 1980,
Applied Technology was still a separate company from
Litton, so it could not depend on large corporate
resources for assistance. Applied Technology
encountered erratic government funding for its first
major weapons system to use software extensively.
Also, competition from other defense electronics
companies was not as intense in 1980 as in 1987. For
example, the concepts of contractor teaming, dual
sourcing, and leader-follower for development projects
were not introduced to the defense industry until
several years after the conceptual exploration phase
for the AN/ALR-67 was completed. These external
environmental factors which differentiate the period
1975-1980 from 1987 allow insight into how Applied
Technology has evolved to meet the current defense
climate via structural and technical changes. Defense
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contractors, in 1987, face more intense scrutiny on




Litton Applied Technology has greatly improved
its cost estimating capabilities. They currently use a
new IBM mainframe computer system to keep track of
price histories, work breakdown structures, and vendor
quotes. However, they have made a conscious decision
not to utilize generic parametric cost estimating
models which could be adapted to the mainframe system.
Litton cost analysts believe the physical dimensions of
their radar warning receivers are too small for
accurate application of the RCA Price cost estimating
model, for example. As a result, all cost improvements
are geared toward upgrading their bottoms-up cost
estimating capability. Their emphasis is on cost
performance trend analysis for their own products.
Litton Applied Technology's cost estimators
understand the difficulties of accurate estimation for
the new integrated circuits of the future. The SOA for
Litton's radar warning receivers will extend into
increasing miniaturization of components, which will be
more reliable and capable than their predecessors.
Litton estimators currently expect vendor-purchased
electronic components to decrease in price in the next
few years due to better integrated circuit technology
and yield improvement. Litton will continue to rely on
its mainframe cost collection system and group judgment
techniques to estimate costs for SOA extensions, with
no foreseeable plans to incorporate regression analysis
or cost prediction models. Finally, due to its
mainframe capabilities, Litton rarely uses personal




Structurally, Litton Applied Technology
utilizes a matrix organization concept for its cost
estimation process. With this system they draft
members from functional departments to participate in
the cost proposal process, terminating the team upon
completion of the negotiated contract.
Litton Applied Technology has the functional
department heads review and approve the proposal team's
recommendations. This current system does not allow
any one individual the opportunity to wield an
overwhelming influence on cost estimates. The
situation differed slightly from 1975-1980, when the
AN/ALR-67 program management team remained intact and
exerted considerable independence.
4 Psychosocial
At the psychosocial level, Litton Applied
Technology has made tremendous strides for its
employees. At its south San Jose location, a new
building with plush offices, a complete cafeteria, and
recreational facilities have been added to improve
company morale. Litton requires all employees,
including executives, to refer to each other by first
names only. Litton's executives also meet annually at
special retreats to discuss the current state of the
company and its future strategy.
Most of Litton's cost estimators are relatively
young, with an accounting background from college.
Litton trains these estimators themselves, rather than
relying on outside cost estimating seminars. They do
not participate in the Space Systems Cost Analysis
Group or belong to the International Society of
Parametric Analysts. Litton has recently published a
comprehensive "Pricing and Estimation Manual" for its
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cost analysts. However, in 1980, few written




The managerial process at Litton Applied
Technology is heavily weighted toward planning and
organization. Almost every area of the building
carries its own blackboard and space for meeting rooms.
According to the Pricing and Estimation Manual, most
meetings have set time limits of five to ten minutes
per topic. Litton exhibits a strong vertical decision-
making structure, since functional department levels
usually do not deal with other functional lower levels





Litton Applied Technology's goals and values
emphasize quality workmanship and reliability. Their
marketing personnel's primary emphasis is on the
excellent performance and versatility of the radar
warning receivers in combat situations. At proposal
team meetings, the actual cost estimates are usually
not the primary issue. Proposal meeting agendas
concentrate on analysis of the competition and




The AN/ALR-67's costs are currently controlled
primarily through vendor control and monitoring of
labor hours. Litton Applied Technology has established
a vendor qualification program to meet its raw material
needs, in order to minimize material defects. Vendor
costs are controlled by trend comparison with prior
related efforts on the mainframe history files. Litton
Applied Technology's internal auditors monitor, via
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surprise visits, the recording of labor hours by each
cost element.
In this researcher's opinion, Litton Applied
Technology could more effectively utilize postaudits as
a control mechanism. Their cost analysts receive
little feedback on proposal cost estimates which are
rejected in favor of another contractor. Postaudit
conferences with cost analysis can provide an effective
"lessons learned" benefit for the future.
D. CURRENT CONCERNS AND TRENDS IN COST ESTIMATION
The current focus of practitioners of SOA cost
estimating is on increasing the range and depth of the
data base. During an interview with Dr. E.N. Dodson on
16 October 1987, he indicated a primary problem in cost
estimating is the lack of good historical data to
substantiate cost prediction models. Dodson indicated
most data for cost models comes from after-the-fact
analysis of costs at the production level. Dodson
feels more rigorous analysis of costs at the design
stage is critical for accounting for technological
change. To properly understand the cost impact of new
technology, Dodson stated cost estimators must become
more knowledgeable in engineering. Engineering
backgrounds would enable estimators to better locate
the cost drivers which are influenced by technology
parameters
.
Another concern of modern cost estimators,
according to Dr. Dodson, is the inability to influence
potential costs during the initial phases of the design
process. Dodson feels cost estimators should develop
the capability to review performance parameters in the
design process, and subsequently advise design
engineers as to the legitimacy of the specifications.
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For example, cost analysts should be capable of asking
If less rigorous specifications could be substituted
for more rigorous ones.
One shortcoming of many cost estimators, according
to Dr. Dodson, is their failure to recognize old
technology under the guise of new technology. Once
estimators increase their technical knowledge, this
mistake will be less likely to occur. Also, better
subdivision of the work breakdown structure into
definable cost elements should sort out old and new
technology.
Dodson feels his theories on the use of surface
fitting techniques and regression analysis to estimate
SOA extension costs are too time-consuming and
expensive. Most corporations involved in government
cost proposals could not efficiently utilize these
techniques. As Dodson indicates, DOD agencies prefer
to audit detailed systems engineered estimates which
substantiate every cost element. DOD agencies do not
require parametric estimates of new developments, so
cost estimators currently use cost estimation models
only as a checking mechanism.
For SOA extension measurement, Dodson states his
current focus is on transforming performance parameters
to design parameters, and ultimately to cost. He
emphasizes efficiency parameters should be utilized in
selecting key technological variables. For example, he
suggests receiver sensitivity, receiver bandwidth, and
receiver frequency might be good indicators of SOA
advance for radar systems.
Finally, Dr. Dodson states risk analysis of cost
estimates is another area which requires further study.
This area should quantify the probabilities that
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underruns or overruns will occur in development
proj ects
.
Stan Swales, the leading cost estimator for GTE
Government Products and a member of the Space Systems
Cost Analysis Group, also shared his opinion on the
current trends of the cost estimating field. [Ref. 28]
Mr. Swales recommends the use of Expert Systems, a
branch of artificial intelligence that is concerned
with emulating the problem solving processes of human
experts. On 28 July 1987 he stated "Expert Systems is
the wave of the future." He feels Expert Systems
technology optimizes the exchange of information and
improves the evaluation of data. For Mr. Swales'
system, cost engineers interview experts and program
their answers into the knowledge base of the Expert
System. The knowledge base should eventually consist
of rules, cost estimating relationships, and a numeric
data base. The next phase of Swales' Expert System
concerns the inference engine, which contains the
control strategies and control structures for the
model. The cost predictor portion of the model
develops cost estimates for programs by combining the
control given by the inference engine with the user's
input data and the knowledge base. Although Swales
utilizes this model to predict costs of programs in the
conceptual exploration stage, it has not been
completely implemented into GTE ' s formal cost
estimating system. The current application of his
Expert System does not specifically quantify SOA
extension costs.
Stan Swales states Expert Systems solve cost
estimating problems by heuristic, or rules of thumb
methods. He believes Expert Systems, with their non-
algorithmic solutions, can more closely mimic
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judgmental cost estimating process than conventional
methods can. In his presentation on Expert Systems to
the Space Systems Cost Analysis Group on 24 September
1986, he drew three conclusions:
1. Expert Systems rapidly adapt to any type program,
with benefits increasing exponentially with
program complexity.
2. Expert Systems cost models designed for desk-top
computers reduce proposal times and improve
program cost control
.
3. Expert Systems techniques reduce potential for
program cost overruns.
E. EMERGING ROLES COST ESTIMATORS MUST ASSUME IN THE
FUTURE
This researcher discovered through personal
interviews with Dr. E.N. Dodson and Stan Swales that
most leading cost estimators have also attained a broad
engineering background. During a presentation to the
International Society of Parametric Analysts during
March 1987, Mr. Edward Laughlin discussed the role cost
estimators must assume to properly assess future
technologies. [Ref. 29]
Laughlin stated cost estimators must improve their
understanding of the total implications of new
technology. He believes analysts must develop closer
coordination with the engineering community to better
understand the technical implications of resource
management decisions. They must be fluent in
acquisition, budgetary, and technical languages since
the cost analyst will become an integrator of staff
information in the future. For example, Laughlin
writes
:
We can't afford to look blank when people start
talking about flexible manufacturing, fiber optics,
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robotics, and composite materials because we're goingto be tasked to recommend important and costlydecisions that can't be made with yesterday'sknowledge. [Ref. 30]
Laughlin believes cost estimators must have
diversified experience and a broad based education to
understand the cost impact of new technology. He
recommends that data bases concentrate on accumulating
information on technological cost drivers, rather than
massive storage of cost histories. He also recommends
that cost estimators continually update their education
and training on future hardware and software trends,
such as computer aided design (CAD) and artificial
intelligence. Finally, Laughlin recommends engineering
specialists become permanent members of cost analysis
divisions to increase the interdependency between
engineers and cost estimators.
F. COMPARISON OF LITTON'S COST ESTIMATING PROGRAM TO
CURRENT DIRECTION OF THE ESTIMATING FIELD
Litton Applied Technology's cost estimating system
has evolved into a bottoms-up system engineered
procedure which makes extensive use of a deep data base
of prior related costs. Their data base consists of
price histories for parts which date back fifteen
years. Extensive labor rate data for carefully defined
job descriptions are also entered into the data base.
Their ability to adapt to the future direction of the
cost estimating field, and their capability to estimate
the cost of SOA advances, are assessed in the following
paragraphs
.
1 . SOA Advance Measurements
Litton does not specifically measure the cost
of the SOA extension. Dodson's use of ellipsoid
surfaces to define the SOA performance parameters has
not been addressed by Litton Applied Technology. Other
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SOA measurement techniques, such as Alexander's
regression analysis of primary parameters, are also not
utilized. Even for conceptual exploration phase
projects, Litton relies on consistent application of
its bottoms-up system. The proposal analyst and the
functional engineers use analogy methods when exact
data from the WBS elements is not available. Litton
cost estimators do not use generic parametric cost
models such as PRICE or FAST.
This researcher feels Litton's expensive
commitment to their bottoms-up method for SOA extension
projects does not provide their analysts sufficient
flexibility for "what-if" analysis. Their exploration
of different alternatives is limited, since detailed
documentation efforts at the WBS lower levels are
mandated for each acquisition phase. Their exclusive
use of the bottoms-up method does not provide
information on the expense involved in increasing SOA
parameters, such as receiver sensitivity, in a timely
manner
.
2 . Expert Systems
Artificial intelligence applications to cost
estimating will become more prevalent in the future.
Litton Applied Technology, with its extensive cos data
base, is missing an opportunity to improve its
estimating capability by not investigating the benefits
of this field. They already possess extensive computer
capabilities which, coupled with their knowledge of
radar warning receivers, makes them ideal candidates
for expert systems.
Some of the opportunities the use of expert
systems would present to Litton are listed.
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a. Learning Tool
Expert systems give users the capability to
obtain the experts' consensus Judgment on what costs
should be, based on the users' answers to system
queries. Litton's cost analysts do not have
postgraduate education or extensive engineering
backgrounds, but implementation of an expert system
would rapidly increase their capabilities to mimic an
expert's answer.
b. Warehouse for Cost Estimating Knowledge
The expert system's knowledge data base
would incorporate the expertise of Litton's most
capable professionals. Their proposal analysis teams
would gain consistency through use of the expert
system, since recommendations by the system would be
based on the same heuristic rules input to the system.
c. Pre-planning Tool
Expert systems, normally designed for
personal computers, provide the rapid flexibility of
what-if analysis missing in Litton Applied Technology's
current system.
d. Research Tool
Litton's cost estimators could perform
research on new projects by studying the implications
of different parameters in a quick, iterative fashion.
Expert systems are expensive, and most are
still in formative stages. This researcher recommends
Litton track the progress of artificial intelligence in
the cost estimating field. Cost benefit analysis
should be performed to see if their data based
management system would be significantly improved.
3 . Influence of Costs in the Design Stage
Cost estimators at Litton do not yet impact
planning of performance parameters at the design stage.
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In the proposal cycle the cost analyst collects Inputs
from the WBS elements, after the specifications are
already decided. However, with the rapid pace of
technology, Litton will gain more effective control of
costs through more rigorous analysis of costs earlier
in the design stage.
4
.
Understanding of Total Implications of New
Technology
Most Litton cost analysts have accounting
backgrounds. They do not regularly attend professional
cost estimating seminars. For Litton to improve its
ability to estimate SOA extension costs, the estimators
must understand how new technology will influence
costs. The cost analysts should receive training on
fields such as artificial intelligence and computer
aided design. This researcher recommends high
technology firms like Litton should consider inclusion
of engineers knowledgeable In future hardware trends in
the cost estimating division.
5 Isolation of Cost Drivers
Litton's ability to estimate SOA extension
costs and control development costs would be enhanced
by a thorough analysis of which design and performance
parameters generate the most significant influence on
cost. Isolation of the key cost drivers for radar
warning receivers would enable planners to concentrate
on cost reductions in these areas.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter's primary goal has been to analyze key
features of Litton Applied Technology through specific
study of the AN/ALR-67's development program.
Preceding sections provided insight into the direction
of the cost estimating field, and the qualities cost
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analysts must develop in the future, before reliable
cost estimates for SOA extensions can be made.
The next chapter provides the final summary and






This chapter presents the summary and conclusions
for this thesis. The primary focus of the research
has been to determine how defense industry cost
estimators measure the costs of SOA extensions for new
weapons systems. The researcher utilized a case study
of Litton Applied Technology's development of the
AN/ALR-67 Radar Warning Receiver to present an actual
example
.
The literature review section highlighted the work
of Dr. E.N. Dodson of General Research Corporation, a
pioneer in the field of SOA measurement. Cost
prediction models by selected authors were also
examined to demonstrate how cost estimation theory is
transformed to actual data. The last chapter
highlighted current concerns and future trends in the
cost estimating field.
B. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review section began with Ostwald's
definition of cost estimating relationships as
functional models that mathematically describe the
costs of components as functions of one or more
independent variables. Ostwald also described the
roles cost estimators play in technological forecasting
and development of cost indices.
Dr. E.N. Dodson has established himself as one of
the foremost practitioners of quantitative measurement
of SOA advances. He described the SOA for a particular
system as an n-dimensional function at a particular
point in time, with n representing the number of SOA
design characteristics. He indicated geometric
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surfaces could illustrate the tradeoff between design
characteristics for SOA advances. Dodson specifically
developed SOA equations for solid propellant missiles.
He also constructed SOA indices by geometric measures
of data characteristics on an ellipsoid surface.
Alexander and Nelson of Rand Corporation measured
technological change through multiple regression
analysis. Their studies indicated performance, rather
than technical
,
parameters were better descriptors of
SOA advance.
Hovanssian recommended electronic systems include
customer acceptance parameters at the development
stage, such as operator approval, life cycle cost, and
amount of maintenance required per operating hour.
Cooley developed the TRAM model, which could analyze
the effects of budget reductions on SOA development
pro j ects
.
Other studies of technological advance were
conducted by Gordon and Munson , who used experts to
choose the proper parameters for their SOA extension
equations. Finally, Marino further refined the role of
surface analysis in SOA measurements.
C. COST MODELS
Four different cost estimating models have been
examined in earlier chapters. The two primary
ingredients in their development were:
1. Derivation of the work breakdown structure.
2. Development of cost estimating relationships for
each cost element.
The cost estimating relationships at the lowest
level of the WBS were derived by a variety of methods
for these models, from parametric analysis to analogy
comparisons. The cost models all provided a hierarchy
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of estimating systems, depending on the data available
to the analyst. In Dodson's models, he recommended
regression equations should only be used as a last
resort
.
The FAST model utilizes technological
characteristics such as energy outputs for its
foundation. Among the products of the FAST model are
projections of funding requirements for each stage of
the development cycle.
D. LITTON' S COST ESTIMATION SYSTEM
Litton Applied Technology utilizes a detailed
bottoms-up cost estimation approach for all electronics
systems projects, including those at the early
development stage. They do not use parametric cost
estimation models; they rely on an elaborate component
cost history data dating back to 1975stored on their
IBM Mainframe computer. Their cost estimation process
involves eliciting judgments from many personnel from
different functions organized in a matrix team
structure. The final cost estimate decision is arrived
at only after a series of judgmental steps at different
committee meetings.
Litton Applied Technology experienced a cost
overrun of 61 percent for the development phase of the
AN/ALR-67 Radar Warning Receiver. Some of the reasons
explaining this cost growth were Litton Applied
Technology's lack of familiarity with software cost
estimation, numerous additions of modifications,
intermittent work stoppages, and poor definition of
manually drafted work breakdown structures. They did
not use any specific techniques or parametric cost





Multiple regression analysis, trade off surface
analysis, and factor analysis have been used by various
practitioners to measure and estimate the actual costs
of SOA extensions. Research has now focused on
analysis of the efficiency characteristics of the
primary parameters which most completely describe the
technological advancement. Interviews with Dr. Dodson
suggest the results of these SOA extension studies have
not been integrated into the current cost estimation
models .
Other cost estimators, like Stan Swales, predict
artificial intelligence will be used more extensively
in cost estimation models in the future. However,
there are no indications Expert Systems methodology has
specifically addressed the issue of SOA extension
measurement in actual weapons systems applications.
F. FUTURE ROLES
The cost estimator of the future must assume the
role of an integrator between engineering and cost
analysis. With many electronic hardware costs actually
decreasing exponentially due to technological
innovation, cost estimators must continually update
their knowledge on the latest technological
innovations. Data bases should contain information on
the cost, performance, and physical characteristics of
the primary cost drivers which influence technological
advancement
.
DOD project offices can reduce overruns in SOA
development programs by decreasing the amount of
administrative and specification changes during the
conceptual exploration stage. However, to facilitate
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this, government cost estimators must become involved
early in the design process, and advise engineers as to
the cost tradeoffs of specification changes.
G. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions can be drawn from this
study
:
1. The systems engineered cost estimating approach
is relied upon by Litton Applied Technology for
its cost estimation methodology.
2. Various methods, such as Dr. Dodson's regression
analysis and surface fitting techniques, have
succeeded in measuring the cost of SOA
extensions. These methods have not been utilized
in actual applications by industry or DOD in
their cost estimating models.
3. The fundamental ingredient to parametric analysis
of technological advancements is specification of
the relationship between cost, performance, and
physical characteristics of the primary cost
drivers
.
4. The development program cost estimate requires a
detailed work breakdown structure in a bottoms-up
method to prevent cost omissions. Errors in this
area are a frequent cause of cost overruns.
5. Cost estimators must possess technical knowledge
of the task being estimated if they are going to
competently measure the costs of technological
advancement
.
6. The cost estimating field is dynamically
increasing its knowledge in the area of
parametric desk-top models and expert systems.
These systems are useful for rapid analysis of
different possibilities.
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H. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
Future thesis efforts are needed to track the
progress of the cost estimating profession in its
endeavor to quantify the costs of SOA extensions.
Also, future studies should review the feasibility of a
large, universal data base for all electronics systems,
from which defense contractors and DOD cost estimators
could extract information. Pooled efforts might
accelerate the progress in transforming technological
advancement theory to actual practice.
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